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ABSTRACT 
 
Information Externality, Bank Structure, and Growth. (December 2003) 
Bo-Eun Doh, B.A.; M.A., Yonsei University, Seoul Korea 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dennis W. Jansen 
  
      This dissertation addresses the question of whether a monopolistic banking system 
can lead to a higher steady state level of capital stock. Specifically, this research 
analyzes the comparative advantage of a monopoly banking system. By doing that, it 
examines factors that contribute to the promotion of economic growth that come from a 
concentrated banking system.  
      There is substantial evidence of a positive relationship between financial markets 
development and long term output growth. Little is known, however, about the role 
played by the market structure of the banking sector on growth. Moreover, little work, if 
any, has attempted to analyze how the degree of information externality affects the 
relative performance of a monopoly and competitive banks. 
      I find that a monopoly banking system might perform better in accumulating capital 
under both low information externality and high information externality under certain 
conditions. In addition, this paper shows that developing countries as well as industrial 
countries may benefit from a concentrated banking system. This result is not found in the 
existing literature, which has only shown that developing countries may benefit from a 
monopoly banking system. 
 iv
      This result can be interpreted as follows: (i) for the developing countries, as the 
proportion of high quality firms is relatively low, the loss in output associated with 
lending capital to lower quality firms is relatively high. In this case, the screening 
technology has enough value-added to compensate for the loss in output associated with 
the typical rent extraction activity of the monopolist. (ii) for the industrial countries, a 
monopoly banking system can overcome inefficiency from free riding problem 
associated with the information externality.    
      This analysis provides an alternative explanation of the recent deregulation and 
resulting trends in mergers and acquisitions. This supports governments’ policy changes 
from restricting merger and acquisition activity to allowing or even promoting merger 
and acquisition activity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
      This dissertation addresses the question of whether a monopoly banking system can 
lead to a higher steady state level of capital stock. Specifically, this research analyzes the 
comparative advantage of a monopoly banking system. By doing that, it examines 
factors that contribute to the promotion of economic growth that comes from a 
concentrated banking system.  
      Over the past decade the banking industry has undergone many changes including 
more severe competition from non-bank financial institutions, recurring banking crises1, 
wide-ranging financial deregulation,2 and the advent and rapid growth of electronic 
banking3 followed by breakthrough in informational technologies. 
      Figure 1 shows the recent changes in economic and financial environments. 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style and format of Econometrica. 
1 The disastrous collapse of U.S. Savings and Loans (S&Ls) in late 80s, the Chilean banking crisis in the 
80s, the Argentine and Mexican crises in the mid 80s and 90s, as well as the recent turmoil in East Asia 
(97-98), Russia (98) and Latin America (98-02) are only a few examples. We have significant evidences 
that after a crisis, the market structure of the financial institutions has become considerably more 
concentrated. Appendix A describes how market concentration changes after crisis in Korea. 
2  In 1999 U.S has introduced the Gramm-Leach and Bliley Financial Service Modernization act, which 
replaces the Glass-Steagall Act. The Act provides more momentum for the consolidation of financial 
services. By eliminating the statutory barriers among the banking, insurance, investment banking, the 
financial institutions can offer such a diversified set of financial services as banking, investment, 
insurance. For the regulatory structure and history of bank regulation in U.S, see Madura (2001) pp.468-78 
3 According to the Basel Committee Report of Banking Supervision (1998), electric banking refers to the 
provision of retail and small value banking products and services through electronic channels. Thus, in the 
most encompassing definition, electronic banking would run the gamut from direct deposits, ATMs, credit 
and debit cards, telephone banking, to electronic bill payment and web-based banking.  
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FIGURE 1.- Changes in Economic and Financial Environments 
 
 
      Advances in information technology make it possible that information is more 
rapidly transmitted among banks. The rising importance of credit risk, a major issue in 
the banking industry in the 1990’s, has led to a move to establish an aggregate credit 
evaluation system which would aggregate and share credit information between banks, 4 
                                                 
4 During 1990’s, many countries have established an aggregate information system which leads to a 
significant information externality. Conventional wisdom suggests that in general, market equilibrium will 
be inefficient in the presence of externalities and also suggests that one of the solutions to externality is 
merger and acquisition to internalize the externality.    
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e.g. see Appendix A for the case of Korea. This in turn is leading to a substantial 
information externality5.  
      In response to environment changes and strategic considerations such as economies 
of scale and market power, banks have grown through the purchase and absorption 
(P&A) or mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of other financial institutions. As a 
consequence, the underlying structure of banking industry has become more 
concentrated. Table I shows the bank concentration ratio of major countries which is 
calculated by the sum of the market shares (measured by total assets) of the three largest 
banks. 
      There have been heated controversies about the advantages and disadvantages of a 
concentrated banking system among economists, policy makers and the general public. 
The issues raised include: Is this trend a right direction? Why have many countries 
recently deregulated to motivate M&A?6 Do they have reasons to rationalize policy 
change from anti-M&A to pro-M&A? 
                                                 
5 The information externality referred to here arises from the fact that once information on firm’s credit 
quality is created, it can be immediately transmitted to other banks. The literature on public goods show 
that the free riding problem associated with such an externality leads to inefficient provision of public 
good. See Varian (1992). In the banking industry, the free riding problem arises when it is assumed that a 
bank’s decision to extend or deny a loan is observable. For more details, see Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) 
6 Deregulation for less competitive financial markets is seemingly paradoxical as one of the primary goals 
of deregulation has been to improve the efficiency of banks by increasing competition among them. 
However, bank regulators have recently admitted that concentrated banking and financial industries can 
help to stabilize financial systems and consequently can enhance social welfare. 
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      There is substantial evidence of a positive relationship between financial markets 
developments and long term output growth.7 However, little is known about the role 
played by the market structure of the banking industry in capital accumulation and 
economic growth. In addition, little work, if any, has attempted to explore the policy 
implications of changes in banking market structure. 
      Although several studies have addressed the issue of whether a monopoly banking 
system has better performance in terms of economic growth, there have been theoretical 
debates over the effects of competition on capital accumulation and real economic 
activities.  
 
Table I 
Bank Concentration Ratio 
          (%) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Germany 40.7 42.7 44.9 54.1 
Japan 20.0 20.3 22.8 24.8 
UK 54.9 52.4 45.8 52.9 
US 16.0 15.9 19.9 20.0 
OECD 57.0 55.6 54.8 62.3 
non-OECD 64.5 61.4 61.0 67.2 
                       Source: Worldbank Database 
                                                 
7 Schumpeter (1911), Cameron (1967), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) emphasize 
the fact that financial markets affect and are affected by economic growth. Recently, King and Levine 
(1993) Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) show that the strong, positive 
relationship between financial intermediary development and economic growth.    
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      Conventional wisdom suggests that competition promotes efficiency. In this view, a 
monopoly bank would exercise its monopoly power to extract rents by charging higher 
loan rates and/or by paying lower deposit rates. The resulting decreased supply of funds 
and the associated higher lending rates would lead to a slower process of capital 
accumulation. Smith (1998) and Guzman (2000b) provide support for this conventional 
wisdom by showing that a competitive banking system performs better in accumulating 
capital stock.  
      However, some argue that the literature on efficiency in banking does not consider 
how the banking industry differs from other industries8. For example, Allen and Gale 
(2000) argue that the standard competitive paradigm is not appropriate for the banking 
industry. Unlike the assumptions of the conventional wisdom, neither markets nor 
information tends to be complete in the banking industry. One of the crucial limits of the 
conventional wisdom is that it is not consistent with historical evidence9. Petersen and 
Rajan (1995), Caminal and Matutes (1997) and Schnitzer (1998) show that a monopoly 
banking system performs better with respect to promoting economic growth. They show 
that a monopoly bank can more easily overcome the problem of asymmetric information 
by close ties with firms.10 A monopoly bank also benefits from choosing the most 
                                                 
8 See Berger and Mester (1997) for the survey of the literature. 
9 See Gerschenkron (1965), Cohen (1967) and  Sylla (1969). Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) summarize the 
effect of concentrated credit market on economic development and industrialization.   
10 In addition, as seen in Petersen and Rajan (1995), firms with lower credit quality such as new firms and 
small firms are able to obtain fund more easily as the number of banks is reduced, since banks then have a 
higher probability of sharing the potential future profits of firms. In this view, the loss from extracting rent 
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profitable projects (by reducing adverse selection) and making firms use funds in less 
risky projects (by preventing moral hazard). 
      The contradictory results listed above are mainly due to different views of the 
banking business. When we focus on the transactional function of banks, a more 
competitive system has better performance, but when we focus on relationship banking, 
a less competitive system has better performance in promoting economic growth.11   
      The studies focus on the asymmetric information structure between banks and firms. 
However, little, if any, work has attempted to explore the effect of the information 
externality12 on relative performance between a monopoly and a competitive banking 
system. Much of the literature on public goods argues that in general an externality leads 
to inefficient provision of the public good. If there is an information externality, a 
competitive equilibrium may not Pareto dominate. In other words, the superiority of the 
competitive paradigm depends on other features such as the degree of information 
externality and, for the case investigated here, the elasticity of capital demand and the 
proportion of high quality firms.  
      This paper shows that the presence of an information externality together with 
asymmetric information can explain how an economy with a monopoly bank might have 
a higher steady state level of capital stock than an economy with a competitive banking 
                                                                                                                                                
is compensated by the gain from overcoming the problems associated with asymmetric information and 
from increased lending to small and new firms. 
11 See Boot and Schmeits (1998) for the difference between transaction-oriented and relationship-oriented 
banking businesses. 
12 Information externality refers to the fact that once information on firm’s credit quality is created, it can 
be immediately transmitted to other banks.  
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system. The presence of investment technologies subject to costly state verification is 
essential to understand how a monopoly bank performs better compared to a competitive 
bank. I assume that the state verification of investment projects (hereafter, I will state it 
as screening activities) is economically meaningful. That is, I assume that the benefits of 
screening activities exceed the cost.  
      This paper shows that the optimal strategies for competitive banks are dependent 
upon the degree of the information externality. For example, competitive banks do not 
engage in screening activities in the case of a high degree of information externality, 
while they do engage in screening if there is a low degree of information externality.  
      The optimal strategy for duopoly banks is the same as that of competitive banks if 
there is no commitment each other to choose a certain strategy, the optimal strategy for 
duopoly banks is “no screening” in the case of a high degree of information externality, 
while “screening” in the case of low degree of information externality. Hence, the 
duopoly model with no commitment will have same result as the competition model.  
      Unlike both competitive banks and oligopoly banks, the best strategy for a monopoly 
bank is to screen regardless of the degree of information externality. Hence, in the case 
of high degree of information externality, a competitive banking system and duopoly 
banking system may have negative repercussions for capital accumulation, as benefits 
from screening are greater than screening costs.  
      This paper extends the Cetorelli’s (1997) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) 
framework by incorporating several features relevant to the current economic 
environment. This research is more comprehensive than previous work because it 
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compares the behavior of competitive, monopoly and duopoly banks. In addition, a 
novelty of this research is that the model allows various degrees of the information 
externality, and information is treated as both private and public, depending on the 
degree of the information externality. If there is perfect information externality, then  
information obtained by a bank is a public good in the sense that once one bank acquires 
information other banks know the information immediately and without cost. In contrast, 
if there is no information externality, then information on a firm’s quality is private 
information in the sense that it is owned and used exclusively by the information- 
acquiring bank. Finally, I incorporate an indicator for the degree of financial market 
development, and an explicit the elasticity of capital demand. 
      The major finding of this paper is that a monopoly banking system might lead to 
better performance in accumulating capital under both a low and a high degree of 
information externality. This is opposite to the conventional wisdom, see e.g. Cetorelli’s 
(1997)13. A monopoly bank benefits from the allocative efficiency associated with 
screening activities (specifically, screening activities are closely related to the 
relationship between banks and firms) and the absence of a free riding problem 
associated with the information externality. A monopoly bank can easily overcome the 
problem of asymmetric information by close ties with firms.14 But it also can overcome 
                                                 
13 He finds that the competitive banking system usually has better performance. However if the proportion 
of high quality firms is low, then the monopoly banking system may have better performance. This 
suggests a positive role for a monopoly bank and it may be true especially for developing countries.   
14 In addition, as seen in Petersen and Rajan, firms with lower credit quality are able to obtain funding as 
the number of banks becomes less, since banks can share the potential future profit of firm. In this view, 
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the free rider problem associated with the information externality by making investment 
on information technology at an efficient level. See e.g. Petersen and Rajan (1995), 
Caminal and Manutes (1997) and Schnitzer (1998) 
      In addition, this paper shows that a monopoly banking system is more likely to 
achieve a higher level of steady-state capital as the degree of information externality 
increases. It also shows that (i) a monopoly banking system has a higher steady state 
level of capital as financial markets advance, and (ii) the negative repercussion of capital 
formation, associated with rent extraction activity in the monopoly banking system, 
becomes worse as an economy has higher elasticity of capital demand. Hence, for the 
industrial countries having highly developed financial markets, a high elasticity of 
capital demand, and a high degree of information externality, the net effect of a 
concentrated banking system is ambiguous.   
      This research suggests that developing countries as well as industrial countries may 
benefit from a concentrated banking system. This result is not found in the existing 
literature, which has only shown that only developing countries may benefit from a 
concentrated banking system.15   
      This can be interpreted as follows: (i) for the developing countries, as the proportion 
of high quality firms is relatively low, the loss in output associated with lending capital  
                                                                                                                                                
the loss from extracting rent is compensated by the gain from overcoming the problems associated with 
asymmetric information and from increasing loan amount to small and new firms. 
15  Cetorelli (1997) finds that the beneficial effect of a monopoly bank would be maximized when the 
proportion of high quality firm is low. This condition suggests that a monopoly banking system is 
beneficial to growth for developing countries.    
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to lower quality firms would be relatively high. In this case, the screening technology 
has enough value-added to compensate for the loss in output associated with the typical 
rent extraction activity of the monopolist; (ii) for the industrial countries, a monopoly 
banking system can overcome the inefficiency associated with the free riding problem 
that arises from the information externality.    
      This analysis provides an alternative explanation of the recent deregulation and 
resulting trends in mergers and acquisitions, as well as an explanation for the apparent 
government policy changes from anti-M&A to pro M&A. 
      The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. In Section 3, the model and its relevant factors are described. Section 4 
analyzes the effect of bank structure on the lending strategy and derives equilibrium in 
each banking system. In Section 5, the long run equilibrium of capital, which is unique, 
is compared among each banking system. Section 6 discusses policy implications and in 
Section 7, the conclusion is presented.  
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2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
      This section reviews five strands of issues on intermediation theory, financial 
markets and growth. Section 1 describes the intermediation theory, focusing mainly on 
the bank’s role to overcome the basic problem of asymmetric information. Section 2 
summarizes the current discussions about the effects of financial market in general and 
bank in particular on the economy. Section 3 explains two distinct financial structures 
i.e. bank-based and market-based financial system. In Section 4, the models will be 
classified into relationship-oriented and transaction-oriented models. Lastly, Section 5 
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of concentrated banking structure.  
 
2.1. Intermediation Theory and Banking Business 
 
      In the traditional Arrow-Debreu model of resources allocation, financial 
intermediaries play no role as firms and households interact through markets. When 
markets are perfect and complete, the allocation of resources is Pareto-efficient. 
Therefore, there is no scope for intermediaries to improve welfare. Moreover, the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem claims that the financial structure of firms does not affect the 
value of firms. In other words, the debt-equity composition of firms’ financial status has 
no effect on the value of the firms. Households can construct portfolios which offset any 
position taken by an intermediary, therefore, intermediation cannot create value.16  
                                                 
16 See the Allen, Gersbach, and Santomero (2001) pp.271-294 
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      Such an extreme view is clearly at odds with what is observed in reality. Historical 
evidence shows that banks have played a central role to improve the economy. Banks 
have transformed savings from the household sector into investments in real assets. They 
select the investment project to be funded and provide incentives for the monitoring. 
Banks may ease risk sharing and pooling by lowering transaction costs and facilitate 
saving’s mobility by economizing on the transaction costs associating with mobilizing 
savings from many different agents and by overcoming the informational asymmetries 
associated with making savers comfortable in relinquishing control of their savings.17 
      Townsend (1979) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) develop some of the banking related 
models based on utility and profit maximization. Their models focus primarily on the 
effect of asymmetric information on the allocation of resources. Followed by these 
researches, Diamond (1984) develops a theoretical framework that models financial 
intermediaries more explicitly. In the model, banks arise naturally as a means for 
overcoming asymmetric information problem and possess economies of scale18 with 
respect to gathering information and monitoring firms, and thus are more efficient than 
individual investors could be. 
 
                                                 
17 For the details, see Levine (2002)  
18 Economies of scale in monitoring loans give bank loans another advantage over bilateral lender 
contracts. Such economies are another reason why in theoretical model bank exists in equilibrium.  
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2.2. Financial Markets and Economic Growth 
 
      Pioneered by Schumpeter (1911), economists argue that financial intermediation 
influences the real economy by accumulating capital stock. They show that the financial 
sector could impact real economic performance by affecting the composition of savings, 
providing information and affecting the scope for credit rationing.19 
      Among early works on this issue, Cameron (1967), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973) emphasize that the financial markets affect and are affected by 
economic growth.20 They suggest that well-developed financial markets are prerequisite 
for developing countries to accomplish the overall economic enhancement. 
      There has recently been lots of empirical studies that explore the relationship 
between financial market development and growth. They also show a strong and positive 
relationship between the development of financial sector and the real economy. King and 
Levine (1993) show that the level of financial intermediary development is a good 
predictor of economic growth. Subsequent studies refine King and Levine and establish 
that financial markets are a source of economic growth.21 
      The studies using time-series data also support that growth can be predicted by the 
degree of the financial market development. Neusser and Kugler (1998), Rousseau and 
                                                 
19 Gertler (1988) discusses about allocating effects of information problem in financial markets. 
20 For a more detailed overview of this work, see the Gertler (1988) 
21 See Atje and Jovanovic (1993), Demirguc-Kunt, Levine (2001), Levine and Zervos (1998), and Levine 
(2002). They have refined King and Levine’s results by showing growth rates in developed countries 
differ from that in and less developed countries as financial markets in developed countries are established 
and mature. 
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Wachtel (1998) show that financial developments are essential for economic growth. 
    In addition, some studies analyze industry-level, firm-level data and event-study. 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) also support that 
the level of financial development has large, causal22 impact on real per capita GDP 
growth. Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) find that the strong, positive relationship 
between the financial intermediary development and long-run economic growth. 
 
2.3. Financial Market Structures: Bank-based vs. Market-based 
 
      This section reviews the distinction of financial markets structure – i.e. bank-based 
and market-based financial system. Table II shows the classification of countries in 
terms of bank-based and market-based. The German model of financial intermediation 
by universal banks is usually considered the prototype of bank-based financial system.23  
      In bank-based financial systems such as Germany, Japan and most Western 
European countries, banks play a leading role in mobilizing savings, allocating capital, 
overseeing the investment decisions of corporate managers and providing risk 
management tools. 
      Contrarily, in market-based financial system such as the United Kingdom and the 
United States, securities markets share center stage with banks in terms of getting the 
society’s saving to firms, exerting corporate control, and easing risk management. The  
                                                 
22 The causality issue that financial development leads to economic growth is somewhat controversial. The 
empirical results of the direction of causality varies country by country. See Shan, Morris and Sun (2001). 
23 For the details, see Levine (2002) 
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Table II 
Country Classification 
 High Income (28) Low Income (30) 
Market 
Based 
(20) 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Korea, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, United Kingdom 
United States (11) 
Brazil, Chile, Jamaica, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Peru, Philippines, 
South Africa, Thailand (9) 
 
 
Bank 
Based 
(29) 
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Venezuela (16) 
Bangladesh, Columbia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, 
India, Kenya, Mauritius, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Panama, Sri Lanka, 
Zimbabwe (13) 
Others 
(9) 
Malta (1) 
 
 
Bolivia, Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Nigeria, Paraguay, Uruguay (8) 
Note: Parenthesis denotes the number of countries. 
The countries whose real per GDP is greater than U$2,975 are classified as high income country and less 
than U$2,975 as low income country.  
Bold represents countries with a well-developed financial market, while italic represents countries with 
under-developed financial market 
Source: Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001), Worldbank Database 
 
 
most fundamental difference between these two systems is that non-financial enterprises 
in a bank-based system are more dependent upon bank-intermediate financing than their 
counterparts in a market-based system. 
      The proponents of bank-based financial systems argue that bank-intermediated 
financing is preferable to other forms of financing because of the potential ability of 
banks to overcome the problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard. Universal 
banks are not only specialized in screening and evolutionary loan proposal, but they also 
rely on economies of scope arising from their involvement with the loan applicant in 
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other lines of business. According to the bank-based view, bank-based financial systems 
are more effective than market-based financial systems for the promotion of the 
economic growth, especially in countries at early stages of economic development.  
      The proponents of the market-based financial system stress the importance of well-
functioning securities markets in providing incentives for investors to acquire 
information, impose corporate control, and design financial arrangements. According to 
the market-based view, market-based financial systems are better for promoting long-run 
economic growth than bank-based financial system.  
      From the differences in the relative performance of the Japanese and U.S. economies 
over the past few decades, many economists have reached a conclusion that bank-based 
and market-based financial systems may provide different growth patterns. Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (2001) provide evidence on the legal, tax and policy determinants of 
financial structure.24 Levine (2002) also tests whether bank-based or market-based 
models have the comparative advantages to promote growth. He finds that the difference 
in financial system does not explain cross-country differences in the long-run economic 
performance. 
 
                                                 
24Allen and Gale (2000) analyze the relative benefits of market-based and bank-based financial system  
 17
2.4. Relationship Oriented vs. Transaction Oriented 25 
 
      The traditional relationship-oriented banking, based on spread between loan and 
deposit rates has declined dramatically26 as firms increasingly seek funding from 
financial markets as the financial innovations such as securitization, derivatives and 
underwriting has greatly progressed. However, in traditional relationship oriented 
banking business, banks hold non-marketable and illiquid assets. The banks’ assets are 
illiquid largely because of their information sensitivity. In originating and pricing loans, 
banks develop proprietary information. Subsequent monitoring of borrowers yields 
additional private information. The proprietary information prohibits the marketability of 
these loans. In these situations, the access to information is the key to understand the 
comparative advantage of banks. In many of their activities, banks use their own 
information and the related network of contacts. The relationship oriented banking is a 
characteristic of value enhancing financial intermediation. 
      Regardless of changes in economic environment such as the breakthrough in 
information technology and the advance in financial innovations, bank loans may 
continue to be optimal instruments.27 Bank-borrower relationship is in nature a mutual 
commitment based on trust and respect. This allows for implicit long term contracts. 
                                                 
25 This section summarized the paper by Boot and Schmeits (1998) 
26 For details, see Edward and Mishkin (1995) 
27 Bank loans are generally easier to renegotiate than bond issues or other capital market funding. The 
renegotiation allows for a qualitative use of flexibility. Firms may realize that they can renegotiate ex post. 
Therefore granting priority to bank loans may help firms with priority, banks may strengthen its 
bargaining position and thus become tougher.  
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Information asymmetries in the financial markets and non-contractibility of various 
pieces of information would rule out long-term alternative capital market funding 
sources as well as explicit long term commitments by banks. Therefore, both bank and 
firm realize the added value of their relationship, and will seek to foster their 
relationship.28 29 
      An investment bank is generally considered as an example of transaction oriented 
banking. Investment banks facilitate transaction as brokers and underwrite public 
placements. By underwriting new issues, investment banks process and absorb credit and 
placement risk, which is similar to that encountered in traditional bank lending. 
Underwriting also requires information acquisition about borrower.  
      Many studies analyze the macroeconomic difference between two banking systems, 
monopoly and perfect competition. Some show that a monopolistic banking system has 
better performance in promoting growth, while others show that a competitive banking 
system performs better. Petersen and Rajan (1995), Caminal and Matutes (1997) and 
Schnitzer (1998) emphasize relationships between banks and firms. They focus on long-
term relationship between banks and firms and claim that the firm facing a monopoly 
credit market is more likely to form a strong tie with the bank. A monopoly bank, hence, 
                                                 
28 Mayer (1988) and Hellwig (1991) discuss the commitment nature of bank funding. Boot, Thakor and 
Udell (1991) address the credibility of commitments. Schmeits (1997) formally considers the impacts of 
discretion (flexibility) in bank loan contracts on investment efficiency. 
29 Bank loans are generally easier to renegotiate than bond issues or other capital market funding. The 
renegotiation allows for a qualitative use of flexibility. Firms may realize that they can renegotiate ex post. 
Therefore granting priority to bank loans may help firms. With priority, banks may strengthen its 
bargaining position and thus become tougher.  
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easily eliminates the problem of asymmetric information. The monopoly bank benefits 
from choosing the most profitable firms or projects (by eliminating adverse selection) 
and making firms to use funds in less risky way (by preventing moral hazard). In 
addition, as seen in Petersen and Rajan, as market power increases, firms with lower 
credit quality are able to obtain funding since banks can share the potential future profit. 
In this view, the loss from extracting rent is overwhelmed by the gain from overcoming 
the problems associated with asymmetric information and increasing loan amount to 
small and new firms. Therefore, they conclude that monopolistic banking system is 
better to promote GDP growth. 
      Contrary to a relationship-oriented model, Cetorelli (1997), Smith (1998) and 
Guzman (2000b) emphasize the transactional function of banking business and find that 
less competitive system may be detrimental to the economy. As advances in financial 
innovations, securitizations and underwriting push funding to the financial markets, 
banks should focus on transactional function. In this view, a big bank, resulting from 
M&A may lose transparency and therefore reduce the effectiveness of market discipline. 
Thus, more competition can lead to higher efficiency in the economy.  This result is 
consistent with conventional wisdom. 
      These contradicting results come from different views of banking business. Unlike 
many businesses, banks do not produce physical goods, but rather, provide the financial 
means for production. One of the biggest problems faced by the banking sector is the 
lack of information about the quality of firms and of the project they have. This 
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asymmetric information leads to problem of adverse selection and moral hazard. These 
inherent problems can be eliminated more easily by a monopolistic banking system.    
 
2.5. Bank Structure and Economic Development 
 
      Conventional wisdom asserts that a monopoly tends to reduce an economy’s overall 
social welfare. Monopoly charges higher prices and produces less goods and services. 
They suffocate invention and innovation, and distort resource allocation, all of which 
reduce the capital stock and growth. These negative aspects of a monopoly might be 
applied to the banking sector. We might predict, hence, that a monopoly bank makes 
fewer loans and has higher interest rates on loans and lower interest rates on deposits 
than a competitive bank. Guzman (2000b) finds that a monopoly bank tends to depress 
the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock, thus, reduces the level of long run 
real activity. He also explains the process by which a monopolistic banking system 
depresses capital stock as follows: a monopoly bank is more likely to lead to credit 
rationing, and if there is a credit rationing, interest rates paid on deposits will be lower 
under a monopolistic banking system. If there is no credit rationing under a monopoly 
bank, the interest rate charged on loans will be higher, but the deposit interest rate is the 
same under the two systems.   
       Regardless of the negative effects of a monopoly, it is possible to find historical 
evidence correlated with the positive role of concentrated credit markets for the 
economic development. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find the following mechanism: 
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concentration of market power in banking facilitates the development of lending 
relations, which have in turn an enhancing effect on firms’ growth and, thus on the 
potential productivity of whole economy. 
       Most of the theoretical literature on the relationship between intermediation and 
growth considers an economy with a competitive banking system. But in practice, 
economies vary in the competitive environment of their banking systems. Table III 
shows an approximate measure for the degree of competition within various countries 
banking sector. 
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Table III 
List of Countries and Bank Concentration Ratio 
Bank Concentration  Country Name Bank Concentration 
Argentina 0.5045   Korea, Republic of 0.3126 
Australia 0.6482   Malaysia 0.4888 
Austria 0.7219   Malta 0.9554 
Bangladesh 0.6439   Mauritius 0.9434 
Belgium 0.6477   Mexico 0.5836 
Bolivia 0.4810   Nepal 0.9018 
Brazil 0.6006   Netherlands 0.7378 
Canada 0.5838   New Zealand 0.6940 
Chile 0.4676   Niger 0.8051 
Colombia 0.4364   Norway 0.8398 
Costa Rica 0.7862   Pakistan 0.7413 
Cyprus 0.8757   Panama 0.4196 
Denmark 0.7438   Paraguay 0.5792 
Dominican Republic 0.6510   Peru 0.6887 
Ecuador 0.3971   Philippines 0.4638 
El Salvador 0.8442   Portugal 0.4578 
Finland 0.8828   South Africa 0.7677 
France 0.4144   Spain 0.4738 
Germany 0.4550   Sri Lanka 0.8187 
Ghana 0.8874   Sweden 0.8831 
Greece 0.7693   Switzerland 0.7591 
Guatemala 0.3735   Taiwan, China 0.4194 
India 0.4727   Thailand 0.5289 
Ireland 0.7350   United Kingdom 0.5565 
Israel 0.8421   United States 0.1865 
Italy 0.3563   Uruguay 0.8718 
Jamaica 0.8226   Venezuela 0.5233 
Japan 0.2170   Zimbabwe 0.8213 
Kenya 0.7393       
• The values reported are averaged over 1990 to 1997 and calculated by the sum of the 
market shares(measured in total assets) of the three largest banks.   
   Source: Worldbank Database 
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3. THE MODEL 
 
3.1. Overlapping Generations Model 
 
      This paper employs a standard two-period lived, overlapping generations model with 
production.30 Population is assumed to be constant and each generation is composed of a 
continuum of agents with unit mass.31 Time is discrete, and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, …  
      Every period, there are two generations (the young and the old) and a single good is 
produced. Young agents are endowed with one unit of labor, which is supplied 
inelastically at the real wage tw , and endowed with one indivisible investment project. 
The size of the investment project is assumed to be identical across firms.  
      Each generation is divided into two types, depending on the quality of their endowed 
investment project, which we label Type 1 (the High-Quality Project) and Type 2 (the 
Low-Quality Project). Type 1 young agents (those with Type 1 projects) comprise a 
fraction (0,1)Φ ∈  of the population, while Type 2 young agents (those with Type 2 
projects) comprise a fraction (1 )− Φ of the population.  
      Both Type 1 and Type 2 young agents are identical with respect to their preferences. 
They prefer operating their own business to working as employee. They derive utility 
                                                 
30 The overlapping generations model has the advantage of providing a tractable framework for dynamic 
general equilibrium analysis, into which heterogeneity among borrowers and lenders is easily 
incorporated. See Bernanke and Gertler (1989) 
31 As there is no distinction between aggregate and per worker variables under a unit mass assumption,  a 
unit mass of workers implies that we will generally have to handle in per capita rather than aggregate 
basis. 
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from consuming the final good both when young and when old. Agents are assumed to 
care only about their lifetime consumption. They have a constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA)32 utility function.  
      Young agents are potential firms. They have access to a production technology 
which has a two-stage process as in Cetorelli (1997); investment and production. 
However, they have no endowment of capital or goods. 
      Old agents have no endowment of either labor or goods, and they have no access to 
the investment project. They have saving from the previous period in the form of 
deposits and equity capital of banks.33 At the end of the period, the old consume all they 
have before dying. It is also assumed that the initial old generations have an aggregate 
endowment of final goods, 0K >0, distributed equally among all of them 
      Banks are institutions owned by old agents as in Cetorelli and Peretto (2000). They 
intermediate resources between old agents born at t-1 and young agents born at t at the 
beginning of time t. At the end of time t, banks recover loans from successful young 
                                                 
32 Given a twice differentiable Bernoulli utility function u(.), the coefficient of relative  risk aversion at c is 
( , ) ( ) / ( )Rr c u cu c u c′′ ′= − . Models with CRRA are encountered often in finance theory, where they lead to 
considerable analytical simplicity. That is, no matter how the wealth of the economy and its distribution 
across individuals evolves over time, the consumption and saving decisions of individuals do not vary as 
long as the interest rate on deposits remain same. See Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) p.194    
33 A standard arbitrage argument requires for an interior solution that the rate of return to deposits be equal 
to the rate of return to equity. I will show this later. 
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agents and pay principal and interest back to old agents. Banks can make profits34, which 
are thus part of the resources that old agents use to finance consumption.  
 
3.2. Two Stage Production Function 
 
      Production is assumed to be a two-stage process in each period; investment and 
production. In the investment stage, a firm makes an investment to produce physical 
capital. The investment project is such that it transforms one unit of goods at the 
beginning of period t into one unit of capital at the end of period t. The outcome of this 
set-up stage is either success or failure.  
      If investment turns out to be successful, a firm can transform one unit of the final 
good into one unit of capital. If investment is unsuccessful, the resources used in 
investment are assumed to be completely lost and a firm will default as in Azariadis 
(1993).35 Figure 2 shows the production process.  
     The young agents with the high quality project (or Type 1 young agents) who 
obtained physical capital in the investment stage have access to the production stage. In 
the production stage, a single final good is produced by using physical capital and labor. 
K units of physical capital and (1+L) units of labor produce F(K,1+L) units of the final  
                                                 
34 This paper compares the relative performance of competitive banks and a monopoly bank. It is generally 
assumed that a competitive bank has zero profits, while a monopoly bank can make positive profits.  
35 This does not affect the results. The advantage of this simplification is that it makes the production stage 
free of any source of uncertainty. 
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FIGURE 2. – Production Process 
 
 
good, where F(•) is a constant returns to scale36  production function. Recall that it is 
assumed that labor supplies are fixed.37 
      Let ( ) ( ,1)f k F k=  denote a standard neoclassical intensive production function, 
where /(1 )t t tk K L= +  is the capital-labor ratio. Kt is aggregate stock of physical capital, 
which is equivalent to successful investment, according to the assumption of one to one 
transformation in the investment stage. The size of loans will be determined by the 
firm’s profit maximizing problem. A high quality firm’s loan contract to banks and its 
profit maximizing problem will be analyzed at the next section. Labor market clearing at 
time t requires  
(1)                                                     (1 ) /tL = − Φ Φ  
                                                 
36 Obviously, mergers between banks might lead to economies of scale. To concentrate this study on the 
“market power”, however, I assume constant returns to scale.  
37 I focus on explaining investment fluctuations rather than employment fluctuation as in Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989). Extensions of the results to the various employment cases are straight forward in principle. 
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since the total labor demand from high quality firms at t is tLΦ , while the total supply of 
labor from low quality firms is (1 )− Φ . 
Hence, a high quality firm’s capital-labor ratio is given by 
(2)                                                  /(1 )t t t tk K L K= + = Φ  
      It is assumed that ( )f k  is a smooth, increasing, and strictly concave function 
with (0) 0f = , i.e. 0, 0k kkf f> <  and Inada conditions38 hold. To fix ideas, I will use a 
Cobb-Douglas production function: 
(3)                                     ( )t t ty f k k
γ= ≡ , 0 1γ< <                                        
where yt and kt are production per capita39 and capital per capita at time t, respectively.  
 
3.3. Nature of Uncertainty 
 
      There are two approaches to model the nature of uncertainty. We can have 
homogeneous agents with different quality of their endowed investment projects, or we 
can have heterogeneous agents. In both cases, it is assumed that banks ex ante do not 
know the quality (or Type) of investment (i.e., the agent type), however they have a 
screening technology which makes it possible to distinguish high quality from low 
quality investments by paying a screening cost. In this economy, then, banks play two  
                                                 
38 These conditions state that 
0
lim ( ) , lim ( ) 0
k k
f k f k
→ →∞
′ ′= ∞ = . Actually, they help to ensure the existence of a 
nontrivial steady state. 
39 Throughout the paper, “per capita” means “per member of a given generation”.  
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important roles as in Diamond (1984). First, they collect savings and give credit to firms, 
thus achieving diversification of idiosyncratic risk. Second, banks possess economies of 
scale with respect to gathering information and monitoring firms. 
 
3.3.1. Homogeneous Agents 
 
      In this model economy, agents are homogeneous, i.e. ex ante identical. They have no 
knowledge of the quality of the investment project they possess. The outcome of 
investment follows a random process40. Banks also do not know the quality of 
investment, ex ante. However, banks have access to a screening technology41 which can 
distinguish high quality from low quality projects. Hence banks ex post have more 
information on the quality of investment than firms. This approach assumes a sort of 
reverse asymmetric information problem from that usually assumed between firms and 
banks in that banks have the potential to have more information than firms. 
      Suppose there are two levels of technology; the restaurant industry and the computer 
industry, and two regions, A and B. Banks can engage in screening activities to find out 
successful firms. Specifically, banks can access information on which technology has a 
comparative advantage in a particular region. Suppose the computer industry (or 
alternatively, the restaurant industry) has a comparative advantage at region A (or B). 
                                                 
40 Investment projects undertaken in a given period have mutually independent outcomes so that there is 
no aggregate uncertainty about the quantity of physical capital produced. That is, expected and actual 
capital per capita are the same.  
41  The screening activities consist of three functions: consulting, monitoring (ex ante) and auditing (ex 
post).    
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The probability of success for an entry in the restaurant industry is 100 percent in region 
A and zero in region B, and vice verse for the computer industry.  
      Suppose also that the proportion of Φ  to the total population adopts the right 
strategy mix of technology and region, while the proportion of (1 )− Φ  adopts the wrong 
strategy mix of technology and region. Agents are assumed to be randomly allocated in 
each cell of technology and region. Hence, the proportion of Φ  to the total population 
will succeed in investment, while the proportion of (1 )− Φ  will fail in the investment. 
Table IV summarizes the strategic mix of technology and region. Banks do not know 
which industry is good for a particular region, ex ante. However, bank can access the 
perfect information by analyzing the characteristics of an industry and those of a region.  
      In this case, banks have the potential to have more information than firms, as 
mentioned. In the real world, we can find that banks provide a consulting to firms 
whether or not to invest a project. The consulting business of banks is a typical example 
of a sort of reverse asymmetric information problem between banks and firms.  
 
 
Table IV 
Strategic Mix Between Technology and Region 
Region 
 
A B 
T-1 (Restaurant) Success Failure 
Technology 
T-2 (Computer) Failure Success 
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3.3.2. Heterogeneous Agents 
 
      In this alternative model economy, each generation is divided into two types, Type 1 
and Type 2. Agents know their own types, ex ante, while banks do not. In particular, 
agents know their type before they borrow. Hence, this approach adopts the standard 
asymmetric information problem between firms and banks in that firms have more 
information than banks when a firm submits a loan application.  
      Type 1 agents comprise a fraction of (0,1)Φ ∈ , while Type 2 agents comprise a 
fraction of (1 )− Φ of the population. Type 1 agents will have a lower cost of investment 
(or higher productivity), while Type 2 agents will have a higher cost of investment (or 
lower productivity). All young agents have identical preferences in that they prefer 
operating their own business to working as an employee.  
      Type 1 young agents are successful in the investment with probability of [0,1]Hp ∈  
and unsuccessful with probability of (1 )Hp− , while young Type 2 agents are successful 
with probability of [0,1]Lp ∈  and unsuccessful with probability (1 )Lp− . Recall that 
Type 1 agents always succeed in the investment, while Type 2 agents are doomed to fail, 
so 1Hp =  and 0Lp = .  
      Table V summarizes the main features of both approaches, as mentioned. The steady 
state level of capital may be different between homogeneous agent case and 
heterogeneous case. However, either approach does not affect the quality of result. I will 
discuss it later.   
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Table V 
Comparison of Both Approaches 
Agent Homogeneous Heterogeneous 
Uncertainty Quality of Investment Project Agents’ Type 
Agents’ Recognition 
 of Outcome Unknown Known 
Banks Unknown outcomes, ex ante. Screening Technology 
Production Two-Stage: Investment, Production 
Asymmetric Information 
Problem 
Ex ante: No  
Ex post: Yes (Reverse) 
Ex ante: Yes (Normal) 
Ex Post: No 
 
 
3.4. Sequence of Events 
 
      This section summarizes the timing of events to clarify the activities of each agent. 
Table VI shows the timing and activities of each agent and bank. It is assumed that every 
period there are two distinctive subperiods, one at the beginning of period and the other 
at the end of the period. The savings of old agents, funding and investment of young 
agents are assumed to take place at the beginning of the period. Production and income 
generation by young agents and consumption of both young and old occur at the end of 
the period.  
      At the beginning of time t, young generations born at time t borrow and engage in 
the set-up stage to produce capital. If it is successful, the capital stock is obtained. If it is 
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not, the firm fails to survive and the firm’s owner becomes a worker. Old generations 
born at time t-1 save in the form of deposits and equity capital at this time.  
     At the end of time t, young agents produce final goods using capital and labor and 
earn an income which is either rent or wage. In addition, they make a decision on 
lifetime consumption, depending on their preferences. Old agents receive the principal 
and interest of their savings and consume the final goods. 
      Banks are institutions owned by old agents. Banks intermediate between the old born 
at t-1 and the young born at t at the beginning of time t. At the end of time t, banks 
recover loans from successful young generations and repay savings to old generations. 
       
 
Table VI 
Sequence of Events 
 OLD (t-1) YOUNG (t) BANK 
Beginning 
. Deposit Dt  
. Buy Equity Et 
 
. Borrow money 
. Investment 
- Capital Stock if  
   successful 
    -Nothing if  
      Unsuccessful  
. Intermediate 
   between old and 
   young agents 
 
 
Time t 
Ending 
. Withdraw Saving & 
   Interest 
 
. Consumption 
. Production 
- Final Goods 
. Earn rent or wage 
. Pay back loans 
. Consumption & 
  Saving 
. Recover loans 
. Pay back to old  
  agents 
Parenthesis denotes the time at which each generation is born. 
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3.5. Credit Market 
 
      It is assumed that credit is fully intermediated. Banks intermediate between savers 
(the old) and borrowers (the young). The intermediation may be taken by monopoly 
(N=1), duopoly (N=2) or competitive banks (N is sufficiently large). It is assumed that 
there is no government or central bank, that banks in aggregate have access to a quantity 
of capital which is exactly the same amount as the old generation’s saving. In addition, 
banks are assumed to lend the maximum available funds to potential firms. This implies 
that the credit market always clears at an equilibrium interest rates on loans. 
      The loan contract between banks and firms is assumed to be built from standard 
single period debt contracts as in Sharpe (1990). A single-period debt contract consists 
of a gross real interest rate on loans, LtR , and the corresponding repayment schedule,
42  
if investment is successful 
(4)                             
L
t tl R
ν

 
if investment is unsuccessful 
 
where tl  is the size of the loan, equivalent to the indivisible project size chosen by a firm 
at time t, and ν  refers to either the residual values of a investment or penalty levied on 
the unsuccessful young agents. For simplicity, it is assumed that no penalty is levied, i.e. 
0ν = . 
                                                 
42 This contract shows that if a firm succeeds in the investment, he repays loans with interest, but if not, a 
firm defaults and bank can have the ownership of residual value of the project. With the assumption of no 
residual value of project ( and  no penalty), 0ν = , so banks cannot recover failed loans.  
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      In the case of heterogeneous agents, we have a pooling equilibrium if there is no 
penalty, while a separating equilibrium if there is penalty levied on unsuccessful agents. 
That is, all young agents, regardless of their Types, want to borrow and start to their own 
business if there is no penalty. However, when we levy penalty to unsuccessful agents, 
in equilibrium, successful agents choose “borrowing”, while unsuccessful agent choose 
“no borrowing”. As mentioned, banks are unable to observe firm’s quality, ex ante. 
However, when banks engage in screening, they can distinguish high from low quality 
firms before they provide credit. Hence, banks plays pivotal role in allocating resources 
when there is no penalty as every agent try to borrow, regardless of his Type.  
      In the case of homogeneous agents, we have a pooling equilibrium regardless of 
whether 0ν = or not as the odds of success in investments follows a random process. In 
this case, banks’ screening activities are also important to allocate resource efficiently.  
      Table VII shows the comparison of the equilibrium and bank’s role between no 
penalty and penalty assumption. Previous literature shows that banks plays pivotal role 
in allocating resources efficiently. Taking consideration of chronic excess-demand for 
funds and banks’ positive role in allocating resources as well as concentrating the effect 
of banking market structure on the economy, hence, I need to confine to the case of no 
penalties.43 
                                                 
43  In the case of some penalties levied on unsuccessful agents, we have a separating equilibrium in this 
model. That is, Type 1 young agents borrow a credit to fund an investment, while Type 2 agents do not. In 
this case, screening activities of banks are not needed. Then, the screening activities are not important. In 
that case, the competitive banking system always leads to higher performance in terms of economic 
growth as the allocative efficiency of the monopoly banking system does not exist any longer. This, 
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Table VII 
Comparison With / Without  Penalty 
 No Penalty ( 0)ν =  Penalty ( 0)ν ≠  
Equilibrium Pooling  Pooling Homogeneous 
Agent Case 
Screening Activity Important Important 
Equilibrium Pooling  Separating Heterogeneous 
Agent Case 
Screening Activity Important Unimportant 
 
 
      As in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), however, screening activities imply a cost, b>044 
where b is measured in goods. The screening cost is assumed to be proportional to the  
amount lent.45 Note that banks lend all available funds; the screening cost is proportional 
to savings, i.e.  
(5)                                                    (1 ) tb sµ= −  
where µ is a measure of the level of development of the screening technology.46  
                                                                                                                                                
however, does not reflect the asymmetric information problem, existed between firms and banks, which 
banks are engaged in screening activities to allocate funds in a most profitable way. 
44 The presence of investment projects subjects to a costly state verification is essential in this model to 
understand both the relative advantage and relative disadvantage of a monopoly banking system compared 
to a competitive banking system. It is related to the co-evolution over time of an economy’s real activity 
and its financial system. See Gurley and Shaw (1955)   
45 The advantage of this approach is that it makes screening cost depend upon size of banks. In other word, 
the contribution ratio for both banks, A and B to distinguish high and low quality firms are the same.   
46  Screening technology reflects the developments of financial intermediary. Numerous theoretical models 
suggest that financial intermediaries can lower the cost of researching potential investments, exerting 
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The screening technology reflects the developments of financial intermediary.47 From 
the screening technology, banks produce valuable information about the quality of firms. 
Let tq be the fraction of firms that are screened or verified. With a unit mass of firms, 
tq is the aggregate measure of screened firms. Such information is used either only by 
screen-performing bank or by all banks, depending on the information externality. 
 
3.6. Agents’ Behavior and Factors Market   
 
3.6.1. Homogeneous Agent 
 
      Every young agent has only one investment project and has preferences to make an 
investment on this project. As he has no endowment of capital or goods, he needs to 
borrow from a bank to finance the investment. Agents are assumed to care about their 
                                                                                                                                                
corporate control, managing risk, mobilizing savings, and conducting exchanges. In addition, the level of 
financial intermediary development influences savings and allocation decisions in ways that may alter 
long-run growth rates. See, for example Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991). As the screening cost is assumed to be dependent upon the level of 
screening technology, screening cost is lower when screening technology is high, and vice verse. Given 
the screening technology, a screening cost is proportional to a lending amount.   
47 Numerous theoretical models suggest that financial intermediaries can lower the cost of researching 
potential investments, exerting corporate control, managing risk, mobilizing savings, and conducting 
exchanges. In addition, the level of financial intermediary development influences savings and allocation 
decisions in ways that may alter long-run growth rates. See, for example Levine, Loayza, and Beck 
(2000), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991). Levine, et al  improve upon past 
measures of financial intermediary development, which consist of liquid liabilities of the financial system 
divided by GDP, the ratio of commercial bank assets divided by commercial bank plus central bank assets 
and the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP.  
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lifetime consumption. That is, agents’ utility is derived from consuming final goods both 
when young and when old. Let 1,tc  denote consumption of a young agent at time t, and 
let 2, 1tc +  denote consumption of an old agent at time t+1. Young agents do not know 
whether their investment is successful or not. Hence, they want to maximize the 
expected utility as follows: 
(6)    
1{ , }
max
t tc c +
 ( ) ( )1, 2, 1 1, 2, 1 1, 2, 1[ ( , )] ( ) ) (1 ) ( ) )S S U Ut t t t t t tE U c c c c c cα α α α+ + += Φ + β( + − Φ + β( ,  α < 1        
where superscript S refers to success in investment project, while superscript U refers to 
unsuccessful.  
      The successful young agents can produce a capital stock, equal to 
(7)                                               t tK l=  
reflecting the bank lending. Young agents produce the final good using capital and labor 
and pay back loans to banks. So they have the following disposable income: 
(8)                                    ( ,1 )S Lt t t t t t tDI F K L w L R K= + − −  
where ( ,1 )t tF K L+  is production using capital (Kt) and labor (1+Lt). LtR  is the gross 
interest rate on loans. Applying Euler’s law, the disposable income reduced to real 
wages as marginal productivity of capital equals to interest rates on loan and marginal 
productivity of labor equals to real wage. That is,  
(9)                                    11
( ,1 ) ( ,1 )L t tt t t t
t
F K LR F K L k
K
γγ −∂ += = + =∂  
(10)                                  2 ( ,1 ) (1 )t t t tw F K L k
γγ= + = −  
(11)                                  St tDI w=                
 38
      As mentioned, young agents save for future consumption in the form of deposits (dt) 
and equity capital of banks (et), i.e. t t ts d e= + . Let 1Dtr +  be deposit interest rates and let 
1
E
tr +  be rate of returns on equity capital. The no arbitrage condition
48 guarantees that 
revenue from deposits is exactly the same as revenue from equity capital, i.e. 
1
D
tr + = 1
E
tr + = 1tr + . They make a decision of how much they consume in the current period 
and how much they consume in the next period. Hence, 1,
S
tc  and 2, 1
S
tc + are given as 
follows:  
(12)                                     1,
S S
t t tc w s= − ,    2, 1 1S St t tc s r+ +=  
       If the investment project is unsuccessful, young agents default and are hired by 
successful agents and receive wages. Let tw be the competitive real wage. Similarly, 1,
U
tc  
and 2, 1
U
tc + are given as follows. 
(13)                                   1,
U U
t t tc w s= − ,    2, 1 1U Ut t tc s r+ +=  
      As all agents have same preference and same income, savings from a successful 
young agent is the same as savings from a unsuccessful young agent. By plugging (12) 
and (13) into (6), we can derive optimal level of savings, *ts : 
(14)                                   * 1( )
S U
t t t t ts s s w rν += = =   
                                                 
48 When interest on deposits is greater than rate of returns on equity capital, all agents prefer deposit until 
both rates of revenue equal each other and vice verse. We can derive same conclusion by differentiating 
utility function, expressed in equation (6) with respect to  1
D
tr +  and 1
E
tr + . This has to happen for an interior 
solution. 
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where 1( )trν +  is 
11
1
11 [ ]tr
α αβ
−
−+
 +  
and superscript S and U denote successful and 
unsuccessful agents. 
      Therefore, a representative young agent wants to maximize the following CRRA 
utility function. 
(15)                              
1, 2, 1{ , }
max
t tc c +
 1, 2, 1 1, 2, 1( , )t t t tU c c c c
α α
+ += + β  ,   α < 1                        
                                                s.t 1,t t tc w s= −  
                                                     2, 1 1t t tc s r+ +=  
 
3.6.2. Heterogeneous Agent 
 
      Type 1 young agents want to maximize their own utility. As young agents have 
preference for operating their own business, Type 1 young agents make an investment to 
produce physical capital. To make this investment, they obtain credit by borrowing from 
banks. Their investments will turn out to be successful and they obtain physical capital.  
(16)                                                t tK l=  
Type 1 young agents produce the final good using physical capital and labor and then 
pay back loans to banks. They have the disposable income as follows: 
(17)                                           1 2( ,1 ) Lt t t t t t tDI F K L w L R K= + − −  
where superscript 1 refers to Type 1 (high productivity) young agents and 2tw  is wage 
for Type 2 agents. By applying Euler’s Theorem, we can derive disposable income:   
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(18)                                          1 * * 2( )t t t t tDI w w w L= + −  
where  *tw  is the real wage which is equivalent to marginal productivity of labor. It is 
assumed that * 2t tw w≥ .49  As discussed, 11,tc  and 12, 1tc + are given as follows.  
(19)                                       1 * * 2 11, ( )t t t t t tc w w w L s= + − −  
                                              1 12, 1 1t t tc r s+ +=  
Type 1 young agents’ utility maximization problem, hence, is as follows.  
(20)                              1 1 1 11, 2, 1 1, 2, 1max ( , ) ( ) )t t t tU c c c c
α α
+ += + β(  
                                            1 * * 2 11,. ( )t t t t t ts t c w w w L s= + − −  
                                                  1 12, 1t t tc r s+=  
      Type 2 young agents also want to maximize their own utility subject to a resource 
constraint. As young agents have preference for operating their own business, Type 2 
young agents make an investment to produce physical capital in the case of no penalty 
for default. To make the investment, they also borrow credit from banks. Their 
investments turn out to be failures, thus they are doomed to default. They will supply 
their labor in successful lines of production and receive incentive real wages, 2tw , to 
induce the agent to choose output maximizing action.50 
                                                 
49 This assumption is reasonable in that wage is determined by marginal productivity of labor. We 
assumed that Type 2 agents have low productivity while Type 1 agents have high productivity. Hence, 
*
tw is weighted average of both Type 1 and Type 2 agents’ marginal productivity of labor.  
50 Under the full information about agent’s productivity, we have two optimal incentive scheme. One is 
target output scheme and another is linear incentive payment. This problem is sort of full-information 
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      Similarly, 21,tc  and 
2
2, 1tc + are given as follows. 
(21)                                                   2 2 21,t t tc w s= − ,    
                                                          2 22, 1 1t t tc s r+ +=  
where superscript 2 refers to Type 2 (low productivity) young agents. 
Hence, Type 2 young agents’ utility maximization problem is as follows.  
(22)                              2 2 2 21, 2, 1 1, 2, 1max ( , ) ( ) )t t t tU c c c c
α α
+ += + β(  
                                            2 2 21,. t t ts t c w s= −  
                                                  2 22, 1t t tc r s+=  
In aggregate, the economy has following utility function: 
(23)                              ( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
1, 2, 1 1, 2, 1
1 1 2 2
1, 2, 1 1, 2, 1
max ( , ) (1 ) ( , )
( ) ) (1 ) ( ) )
t t t t
t t t t
U c c U c c
c c c cα α α α
+ +
+ +
Φ + − Φ
= Φ + β( + − Φ + β(  
                                            1 * * 2 11,. ( )t t t t t ts t c w w w L s= + − − ,   1 12, 1t t tc r s+=  
                                                  2 2 21,t t tc w s= − ,   2 22, 1t t tc r s+=  
      Note that net profits derived from borrowing and investing a physical capital are zero 
as the loan interest rate equals marginal productivity of capital in production function. 
Unlike the homogeneous agent case, Both Type 1 and Type 2 agents have different wage 
level since they have different level of productivity. 
                                                                                                                                                
principal-agent problem. In this case, the incentive compatibility constraint isn’t “binging”, hence, the 
Pareto efficient amount of output will always be produced. For details, see Varian (1992) pp.442-444.  
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3.7. Information Structure 
 
      We have two different approaches to model uncertainty. First, it is assumed that 
there are two types of investment projects: high quality and low quality, where quality 
indexes the probability of success in investment. Second, it is assumed that there are two 
types of agents; high productivity (H) and low productivity (L). The probability of 
success in investment for a high quality projects (or high productivity agents) (H) and 
low quality projects (or low productivity agents) (L) are pH , pL respectively, with pH > 
pL.. For simplicity, it is assumed that pH =1 and pL = 0. In other words, high quality 
projects (or high productivity agents) always succeed in the investment stage, while low 
quality projects (or low productivity agents) always fail in the investment stage.  
      In the homogeneous agent case, the quality of a project is not known by either banks 
or agents, ex ante. It is, however known the proportion of high type projects in the 
population. Let [0,1]Φ ∈  be time-invariant proportion of high quality projects in the 
population. It is assumed that the aggregate measure of high quality projects, Φ , is 
common knowledge. In addition, banks have access to a screening technology which 
allows them to distinguish high from low quality projects before they provide credit.  
      Unlike the homogeneous agent case, heterogeneous agent case assumes that young 
agents know their own types, while banks do not know the types of an individual young 
agent. They know, however, that aggregate measure of the proportion of Type 1 agent of 
the population is Φ . With probability of (1 )H Lp pΦ + − Φ , hence, a firm can transform 
one unit of final goods into one unit of capital, and with probability of 
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(1 ) (1 )(1 )H Lp pΦ − + − Φ − , one unit of goods invested at the beginning of period t yields 
nothing at the end of period t.  Note that 1Hp =  and 0Lp = . In other words, young Type 
1 agents always succeed in the investment stage, while young Type 2 agents always fails 
in the investment stage.  
      Let ( ) { , }i H Lη ∈  be the perfect (screened) information of the firm i’s quality, where 
Hη =  if the set-up stage is successful and Lη =  if it fails and let ( ) { , }i H Lη ∈ % %%  be the 
noisy signal of ( ) { , }i H Lη ∈  as in Sharpe (1990)51. Let SB  and OB be the screening 
banks and outside banks, respectively. The “screening banks”, SB  observe the firm i’s 
quality at the cost of b, while the “outside banks” that do not screen firm i, observe only 
a noisy signal of the outcome, ( ) { , }i H Lη ∈ % %% . The signal ( )iη%  is assumed to be fixed for 
any particular firm. That is, all “outside” banks observe the same outcome of that 
signal,52 and they do so without cost.  
      Suppose the conditional distribution function is given by 
(24)                   ( / ) ( / ) (1 ) / 2prob H H prob L Lη η ξ= = = = +% %% %                     
                         ( / ) ( / ) (1 ) / 2prob H L prob L Hη η ξ= = = = −% %% %     
 
                                                 
51 The basic idea for noisy signal comes from Type I and II error in statistics. Type I error tells that bank 
rejects to provide credit to high quality firms, i.e.  ( / )prob L Hη = %% , and Type II error implies that banks 
accept a loan application and give a credit to low quality firms, i.e. ( / )prob H Lη = %% . 
52 I assume that a firm which rejected previously by one bank will not submit a loan application to other 
banks. Allowing a subsequent application leads to the “Winners Curse” in that the pool of loan applicants 
all banks faced is systematically worsening. If a lender has a customer relationship with a borrower, 
winners curse problem will be mitigated. See Shaffer (1998)   
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where [0,1]ξ ∈  refers to degree of information externality.       
      If 0ξ = , then all probability is 0.5, which suggests that outside banks, OB , do not 
have any clues that would allow them to distinguish high from low quality firms. In 
other words, Banks OB  learn nothing about a firm’s quality. I call this the “no 
information externality” case. If 1ξ = , the probability that they correctly classify a 
firm’s quality. In other words, outside banks know the firm’s quality exactly as do the 
screening bank. This is called the “perfect information externality” case.   
      The assumption of the degree of information externality, except for perfect 
information externality implies asymmetric outcome observability, and in turn, it makes 
lenders have to expend some minimum level of resources to make sure they choose high 
quality projects. In the process of this monitoring, the lender learns more about the 
success of the firm’s set-up stage than do outside banks. In the next section, I will show 
how the degree of information externality affects banks’ optimal strategies for screening 
decision. 
      Bank will lose their willingness to engage in screening as the information externality 
grows. If there is a perfect information externality, the best strategy for a bank is to wait 
and see the outcomes of screening done by other banks. Coase (1960) and Hendricks and 
Porter (1996) show that when there is an information externality, the distinguishing 
characteristic of the strategy for market participants is delay and duplication. Hence, 
banks facing a high degree of information externality tend to invest less in the screening 
technology. As a consequence, however, the economy suffers an allocative inefficiency 
in that bank cannot recover loans to low quality firms. 
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3.8. Bank’s Behavior and Payoffs 
 
      Consider an economy with N banks, where N is an exogenous number. Total saving 
is assumed to be tS at time t, which is distributed equally among the N banks. Hence, a 
bank receives a savings of 
(25)                                               ,
j
b t ts S N= .  
      Consider a firm wishing to finance a project. The firm applies for credit. Suppose he 
receives credit according to loan contract, shown in Section 2.3 and starts an investment 
project. If the project is successful, it generates positive revenues for the bank that 
finances it, while if the project is unsuccessful, the resources lent are totally lost and 
revenues are zero.  
      Consider now the bank’s choices. Note that the bank has a screening technology 
capable of distinguishing high quality projects from low quality projects. He can screen 
the firm before he provides credit at a screening cost, b. If a bank engages in screening, 
he makes a safe loan regardless of what other banks do and regardless of the information 
externality. 
      If the bank decides not to screen, two outcomes are possible. First, in the case of a 
perfect information externality and at least one of the other banks screens the firm, then 
the bank learns the firm’s quality and makes a safe loan without sustaining the screening 
cost. Second, if there is no information externality or if no other bank screens the firm, 
the bank makes a risky loan whose expected payoff depends on the unconditional 
distribution of high quality projects, Φ . The following examples give useful insights to 
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understand the equilibrium payoffs of banks both with screening and with no screening 
activities. 
 
3.8.1. All Banks Perform Screening 
 
      Suppose all banks are engaged in screening activities, i.e. SB N=  and 0OB = . Then 
only high quality firms will receive loans regardless of information externality as 1Hp = , 
0Lp = . An individual bank can lend a maximum of , ,( )j jb t b ts s bµ = − , which is recovered 
completely. In the process of intermediation, high quality firms’ idiosyncratic risk will 
be eliminated at the aggregate level. Hence, a bank’s expected revenues will be  
(26)                                                    1 ,
L j
t b tR sµ+ ×                              
where 1
L
tR +  is interest rates on loan, which determined by loan contract and µ is the level 
of screening technology. 
 
3.8.2. No Banks Perform Screening 
 
      Suppose no banks engage in screening activities, i.e 0SB =  and OB N= . Then, a 
bank has to lend to all entrepreneurs indiscriminately, regardless of the information 
 47
externality.53 In this case, the lending assets (sb,t) lent to high quality firms ( Φ ) turns out 
to be successful (physical) capital, so a bank’s expected return will be  
(27)                                                   1 ,
L j
t b tR s+ ×Φ             
where Ф is the time-invariant proportion of high quality firms. 
 
3.8.3. Some Banks Perform Screening 
 
      Suppose the proportion of (0,1)tq ∈ to total banks is engaged in screening activities, 
i.e S tB q N=  and (1 )O tB q N= − . Suppose there is perfect information externality. In 
other words, screening results are transmitted to other banks immediately. Then, outside 
banks offers better contracts to screened high quality firms. If (0, 0.5)tq ∈ , outside 
banks offer better contracts to screened high quality firms, and screening banks cannot 
lend to their own screened  high quality firms and instead give credits to all unscreened 
firms. Outside banks, who have a competitive advantage on the loan interest rates, lend 
to screened high quality firm. Excess credit will be given to all firms unscreened. If 
(0.5, 1)tq ∈ , outside banks lend all their available credit to screened high quality firms. 
Screening banks lend to screened high quality firms first, and then lend to all unscreened 
firms indiscriminately 
                                                 
53 Information externality problem exists when any bank creates information by screening firms. Hence, if 
no bank screens, there is no possibility to have information externality problem.  
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      Suppose there is no information externality. Screening banks can lend to their own 
screened high quality firms, while outside banks lend to all unscreened firms 
indiscriminately. 
      In both cases, of the lending assets ( )1 (1 ) t tq sµ− − , those lent to high quality firms 
( ( )( ) t tq sµΦ + − Φ ) turn out to be successful (physical) capital. Therefore, in aggregate,  
banks’ expected return will be  
(28)                                                   ( )1 ( )Lt t tR q sµ+ × Φ + − Φ             
where ( )µ − Φ  is the increase in allocative advantage from screening activities.  
     Note also that to be economically meaningful for the screening activities, the benefit 
from screening is greater than the screening cost. In other words, the screening cost, 
,(1 )
j
b tb sµ= − , is less than the investment loss from giving credit to low quality firms 
(benefits from screening), i.e. ,(1 )
j
b ts− Φ .54  From this condition, we can derive a relation 
as follows: 
(29)                                                       µ > Φ  
Appendix B shows how the results change when this assumption is relaxed. 
 
                                                 
54 As the developments of the financial infrastructure such as credit rating agency, networking, advanced 
information technology, banks can easily discriminate high quality firms from low quality firms. In that 
sense, the assumption that screening cost is less than the investment loss from lending to low quality firms 
is reasonable from the practical point of view.  
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3.9. Credit and Capital 
 
      This section compares the aggregate credit and physical capital between screening 
equilibrium and no screening equilibrium. From this comparison, we get an idea of the 
main advantages and/or disadvantages of a competitive versus monopolistic banking 
system.    
Definition 1: Let NtX  be aggregate credits provided to all firms under no screening, and 
S
tX  be aggregate credits to all firms under full screening, respectively. In addition, let 
R
tX  be aggregate credits provided to all firms when banks screen firms with probability 
(0,1)tq ∈ .  
Definition 2: Let Ntx  be credits provided to an individual firm under no screening, and 
S
tx  be credits to an individual firm under full screening, respectively. In addition, let 
R
tx  
be credits provided to an individual firm when banks engage in screening firms with 
probability qt,   
Proposition 1: For the aggregate credit to all firms by banks, N R St t tX X X> >  holds. 
However, for the credit to an individual firm, N R St t tx x x< <  holds.  
Proof . See Appendix C.1. 
      Proposition 1 shows intuitively how the no-screening and full-screening equilibriums 
have different implications for credit and successful physical capital. Table VIII 
compares the total credit, the credit per firms and the successful capital among full 
screening, no screening and randomizing. In the no-screening equilibrium, we have the 
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largest credit but suffer an allocative inefficiency. In other words, as seen in Section 2.5, 
if banks lend to all firms indiscriminately, only credit to high quality firms will become 
physical capital and lending to low quality firms is not recovered. Contrary to the no-
screening case, in the full screening equilibrium, we have the least credit in aggregate 
but benefits from allocative efficiency. In other words, total credit to firms would be 
reduced because of the costs of screening, however, the credits supplied to firms are 
completely recoverable as only high quality firms are recipients of loans. In the 
randomizing equilibrium, the aggregate credit supplied and the amount of physical 
capital is in between the no-screening equilibrium and the screening equilibrium.  
 
Table VIII 
Comparison of Credit and Capital 
 Full Screening Randomizing No Screening 
Total Credit tSµ  [1 (1 )]t tq Sµ− −  tS  
Credit per firms ( ) tsµ Φ  ( )(1 (1 )) (1 (1 ))t t tq q sµ− − − − Φ  ts  
Successful Capital tSµ  [ (1 ) ]t t tq q Sµ + − Φ  tSΦ  
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4. EQUILIBRIUM IN THE BANKING SYSTEM 
 
      Note that there are N banks in the economy, where N is an exogenous number. 
Define 
1
0
i
t tS s di= ∫  be equilibrium level of aggregate saving of young agents, where its  is 
the savings of young agent i. Note that t tS s=  with a unit mass as every young agent 
chooses same amount of savings. The total saving, tS  is distributed equally among 
banks. Hence, a bank receives a saving of ,
j
b t ts S N= . Using these savings, a bank offers 
loan contract to firms. 
      To incorporate the nature of uncertainty into the model, I follow the homogeneous 
agent case. Hence, agents are ex ante identical and they do not know the outcome of 
their investment. 
      Consider a bank’s choices. Note that a bank can access the screening technology and 
screen firms before providing credit if he pays the screening cost. If a bank engages in 
screening, he makes a safe loan regardless of what other banks do and regardless of the 
information externality. However, if the bank does not screen, two outcomes are possible. 
First, in the case of a high (or perfect) information externality, the bank learns a firm’s 
quality and makes a safe loan without sustaining the screening cost if one of the other 
banks screens the firm. Second, if there is a low (or no) information externality, or if no 
other banks screen the firm, the bank makes a risky loan whose expected payoff depends 
on the unconditional distribution of high quality projects, Φ .  
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      Now, the optimal strategies of banks in competitive banking system, duopoly 
banking system and monopoly banking system will be analyzed. The optimal strategies 
of both competitive banks and duopoly banks are dependent upon the degree of the 
information externality. For example, the optimal strategies for both a competitive bank 
and duopoly banks are screening if there is a low information externality, but not 
screening if there is a high information externality.55 The optimal strategy of a monopoly 
bank, however, is independent of the information externality. A monopoly bank always 
chooses screening as its optimal strategy.   
      The payoffs for a bank are its profits. Profits equal the revenue minus cost of funding 
and screening. The revenue of a bank is determined by the interest rates on lending, 1
L
tR + , 
multiplied by the successful physical capital. The cost of funds for a bank is determined 
by the interest rates on deposit (or the return on equity capital), 1tr + , multiplied by saving. 
The cost of screening is proportional to savings, as mentioned. 
      As banks are institutions owned by old agents, the profits of banks, if any, would 
belong to old agents. It is assumed that there is no restriction on entry or exit in the 
banking industry. Competition with free entry and exit in the competitive banking 
system, however, assures that a competitive bank makes zero profit.   
                                                 
55 If there is high information externality, the best strategy for a bank is to wait and see the outcomes of 
screening which other banks are engaged in. Coase (1960) and Hendricks and Porter (1996) support this 
view, showing that when there is an information externality, the distinguishing characteristic of the mixed 
strategy for market participants is delay and duplication. Hence, banks facing high degree of information 
externality tend to invest less on screening technology. As a consequence of it, however, the economy 
suffers an allocative inefficiency in that banks give credit to low quality firms. 
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4.1. Competitive Banking Industry 
 
      In this scenario, we assume that the number of banks, N, is sufficiently large. The 
competitive banks are assumed to be simultaneous-move, Nash-competitors56. In other 
words, all banks choose strategies at the same time which give them maximum payoffs, 
taking other banks’ strategies given.  
      A bank j N∈  chooses a strategy mjz  where the superscript m refers to a set of 
strategies, and subscript j denotes bank j. A set of strategies, m, consists of no-screening 
(NS) and screening (S). Let NS=1 and S=2. Then a set of strategies consists of {1, 2}, i.e. 
{ 1, 2}m NS S= = = . For example, 11z  denotes the strategy of bank 1, which is not 
screening, and 22z  denotes the strategy of bank 2, which is screening. A bank chooses its 
optimal strategies, either no screening (m=1) or screening (m=2) simultaneously, 
considering other banks’ strategies and corresponding payoffs.  
      The payoffs are expressed in terms of profits, iπ . In the Nash equilibrium, each bank 
has symmetric payoffs. That is, the payoffs of a bank under a strategy bundle ( 1 21 2,z z ) 
equals that of any other bank under the strategy bundle ( 2 11 2,z z ). The optimal strategies 
and payoffs vary, depending upon the degree of information externality, ξ . 
Definition 3: Let a competitive bank’s profit be denoted by ( )SCπ ξ  under screening 
equilibrium, and by ( )NSCπ ξ under no screening equilibrium, respectively.  
                                                 
56 Hence, competitive banks know strategies of their rival banks and each bank’s strategy is an optimal 
response to the other banks’ strategies. 
 54 
Proposition 2:  There exists a critical degree of information externality, *ξ  such that 
* *( ) ( )S NSC Cπ ξ π ξ=  for competitive banks, and ( ) ( )S NSC Cπ ξ π ξ>  for *ξ ξ< and 
( ) ( )S NSC Cπ ξ π ξ<  for *.ξ ξ>   
Proof.  See Appendix C.2. 
      Proposition 2 implies that in a competitive banking system, banks will retreat from 
engaging in screening activities as the degree of information increases. In Nash 
equilibrium, all competitive banks will be in the no screening equilibrium if the degree 
of the information externality is greater than the critical level, while all banks will be in 
the screening equilibrium if it is less than the critical level.  
      As shown in Appendix C.2, the critical level of information externality is  
(30)                                                     * 2 1ξ µ= −  
By reviewing the relationship between the critical level of the information externality 
and the screening technology, we can show a highly efficient screening technology, i.e. 
µÆ1, causes the critical degree of the information externality to converge to one, i.e. 
* 1ξ = . This implies that that the screening equilibrium has higher payoffs than the no 
screening equilibrium as financial markets advance.  
      As described in the introduction, we might interpret the evidence a suggesting that 
the degree of information externality has recently increased in the banking industry. 
Hence, competitive banks will retreat from screening and have a tendency to 
convergence to the no screening equilibrium. In the next section, I will analyze both the 
no screening equilibrium and the screening equilibrium.  
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     4.1.1 No Screening Equilibrium 
 
      I will show that no competitive banks will engage in screening if the degree of the  
information externality is greater than the critical level. 
      Suppose a competitive bank is engaged in screening and hence discriminates in favor 
of high quality firms at the cost of paying the screening cost, b. As soon as the high 
quality firms are revealed, the outside banks observe the result immediately if the 
information externality is high. Then the outside banks offer a lower lending rate to the 
screened high quality firms. Of course, as the screened, high quality firms want to 
borrow at the lowest cost, they make a contract with a bank that offers the lowest lending 
rates. Hence, screening banks cannot recover the screening cost.  
      In this situation, the optimal strategies of competitive banks are to wait and see the 
outcome of other banks’ screening activities.57 In Nash equilibrium, hence, a competitive 
bank has no incentive to engage in screening activities, and wants to diversify risk by 
lending to as many firms as they can. In other words, a competitive bank faces the free 
riding problem and this, in turn, leads to a no screening equilibrium.  
                                                 
57  Coase (1960), Hendricks and Porter (1996) support this view, showing that when there is an 
information externality, the distinguishing characteristic of the mixed strategy for market participants is 
delay and duplication. Hence, banks facing high degree of information externality tend to invest less on 
screening technology. As a consequence of it, however, the economy suffers an allocative inefficiency in 
that banks give credit to low quality firms. 
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Definition 4: A strategy profile 1 2( , ,..., )
m m m
Nz z z z
∗ ∗ ∗∗ =  constitutes a Nash equilibrium for 
banks in the competitive banking industry if for every j=1, . . ., N, , 0jπ =  and 
( , ) ( , )m m m mj j j jz z z zπ π∗ ∗ ∗− −′≥  for all mj jz Z′ ∈ .  
Proposition 3: The unique Nash equilibrium of the competitive banking industry is 
1 1 1 1
1 2 3( , , ,...., )Nz z z z z
∗ =  if *ξ ξ> , i.e. no banks are engaged in screening activities. 
Proof. See Appendix C.3. 
      Proposition 3 shows that competitive banks have no incentive to be engaged in 
screening activities in the case of substantially higher degree of information externality. 
Instead, they want to diversify risk by lending to all firms indiscriminately. In other 
words, competitive banks face the free riding problem in the case of a high information 
externality that in turn, leads to the no screening equilibrium.  
      When a competitive bank lends to all firms indiscriminately, of the lent assets (st), 
only that lent to high quality firms (Φ ) turns out to be successful (physical) capital, i.e. 
 (31)                                                    1t tK S+ = Φ  
With unit mass for each generation, t tS s= . From equation (2), the equilibrium capital 
stock is   
(32)                                                     21t tk s+ = Φ  
A bank’s expected return will be 1 ,
L j
t b tR s+ ×Φ  where Φ  is the time-invariant proportion of 
high quality firms. In aggregate, the total return of banks will be 1
L
t tR s+ ×Φ with unit 
mass. From the zero profit condition,   
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(33)                                                 1 1
L
t t t tR S r S+ +Φ =                       
where 1tr +  is the cost of funds (I call it deposit interest rate afterward) and 1
L
tR +  is the 
interest rate on loans. The rental rate for successful physical capital, LtR , and real wage 
tw  are determined in equation (9) and (10). Plugging the optimal amount of saving at 
time t, *ts  , expressed in in equation (14) into CRRA utility function, expressed in 
equation (15), we can derive deposit interest rates as follows, 
(34)                                                     
1 1*
1 *
1( ) [ ]C t tt
t
w sr
s
α−
α α+
−= β                 
where superscript C refers to a competitive banking system.  
      Note that 
1
0
i
t tS s di= ∫  is equilibrium level of aggregate saving of young agents and 
that t tS s=  with a unit mass as all agents choose same s*.  Only lending to high quality 
firms will become physical capital at next period when banks do not screen the firms, as 
mentioned. From equation (32), 
(35)                                                   2 1t ts k
−
+= Φ                                 
Substituting (16), (35) into (34), we have  
(36)                                      
1 12
1
1 2
1
1( ) [ ]C t tt
t
k kr
k
γ α−−
+α α+ −
+
(1− γ) −Φ= β Φ                              
Substituting equations (14), (36) into (33), I obtain                                       
(37)                                
1 2 1
1
t 1
2 1
1
[ 1]1( )
[ 1]
t t
t t
k kk
k k α
γ
γ −
γ−1 +α+1
γ −
+
 Φ (1− γ) − Φ =  β  Φ (1− γ) − 
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This shows the equilibrium law of motion for the per capita capital stock, k in the 
competitive credit market58  in the case of *ξ ξ> .  
 
4.1.2 Screening Equilibrium 
 
      In Nash equilibrium, all competitive banks59 participate in screening activities if 
*ξ ξ< as the screening cost is less than the investment loss from lending to low quality 
projects. As the payoffs of competitive banks are higher when they are engaged in 
screening activities, the best strategy is to screen all firms. The point is that they do not 
suffer free riding problem if the level of the information externality in the banking 
industry is less than the critical level. For the purpose of comparison between no-
screening equilibrium and screening equilibrium, hereafter, I will call screening 
equilibrium as equilibrium in the monopolistically competitive markets.  
Proposition 4: The unique Nash equilibrium of the competitive banking industry is 
2 2 2 2
1 2 3( , , ,...., )Nz z z z z
∗ =  if *ξ ξ< . 
Proof. See Appendix C.4. 
                                                 
58 The right hand side refers marginal cost, while the left hand side refers marginal revenue per a capital 
stock in the competitive banking system.  
59 In the economy with incomplete, asymmetric information, banks do not satisfy the assumption of 
competitive market. Instead, it satisfies the assumption of monopolistically competitive market. For 
example, it has the property of monopoly market in that a bank has a monopoly power for the firms that he 
contacts. While it has the property of competitive market in that the number of bank is sufficiently large to 
assure no excess margin and it is free to enter and/or exit in the market.   
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      As banks screen all firms, they can lend only to high quality firms. As in Proposition 
1, in screening equilibrium, total credit available is total saving minus screening cost, i.e. 
1
S
t tX Sµ+ = . With a unit mass in each generation, t tS sµ µ= . As all credits are allocated 
to only high quality firms, all of those credits will be turned into productive capital, i.e.  
(38)                                            1t tK sµ+ =  
The equilibrium capital-labor ratio is given by 
(39)                                            1t tk sµ+ = Φ                                    
From equation (39),              
(40)                                           1 1( )t ts kµ − += Φ                   
Similarly, we can derive the equilibrium level of saving at time t, *ts  from the utility 
maximization problem, expressed in equation (7). From the market clearing condition, 
we can also derive deposit interest rates, 1tr + .  
(41)                              
1 11
1
1 1
1
( )1( ) [ ]
( )
MC t t
t
t
k kr
k
µ
µ
γ α−−
+α α+ −
+
(1− γ) − Φ= β Φ                                         
where the superscript MC refers to monopolistic competition. From banks’ zero profit 
condition,  
(42)                                           1 1
MC
t t t tR s r sµ + +=                                               
Substituting equation (14), (41) into (42) and canceling out the common factor ts ,                                      
(43)                            
1 1
1
t 1
1
1
[ 1]1( )
[ 1]
t t
t t
k kk
k k α
µµγ
µ
γ −
γ−1 +α+1
γ −
+
 Φ(1− γ) − =  β  Φ(1− γ) − 
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This shows the equilibrium law of motion for the per capita capital stock, k in the 
competitive banking system in the case of *ξ ξ< . 
 
4.2. Duopoly Banking Industry 
 
      In this economy, it is assumed that there are N>1 banks. Suppose N=2 (Duopoly)60. 
Both banks are Bertrand competitors.61 Consider a two stage game. In stage one, the 
banks decide whether to screen or not. In stage two, they choose the price at the market 
clearing loan amount. Recall that they lend all available credit. 
      Let LiR  be the loan interest rates charged by bank i. By symmetry, bank i’s reaction 
function is *( )L Li j iR Rϒ = and bank j’s reaction function is *( )L Lj i jR Rϒ = . The Nash 
(Bertrand) equilibrium satisfies * *( )L Li i jR R= ϒ , and * *( )L Lj j iR R= ϒ . Note that savings 
are distributed evenly between banks. This implies that both banks offer the same 
deposit interest rate. Hence, each bank gathers half of total savings.62 
 
                                                 
60 The duopoly (N=2) model can be extended to the oligopoly (N>2) model. The results of the duopoly 
model are the same in quality as that of the oligopoly model. See Cetorelli and Peretto (2000)   
61 In Bertrand competition, each bank chooses its price (i.e., interest rates on deposits and loans) both 
simultaneously and non-cooperatively. A Nash equilibrium in prices-sometimes referred to as a Bertrand 
equilibrium- is a pair of prices such that each bank’s price maximize that bank’s profit given other bank’s 
price.   
62 In this economy, banks are identical both in cost and revenue function. And they have same screening 
technology. Therefore, there is no incentive for saver to prefer one bank to another bank. 
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4.2.1 No Screening Equilibrium 
 
      No duopoly banks will be engaged in screening if the degree of information 
externality is greater than the critical level of information externality in the banking 
industry, as mentioned. Note also that high information externality implies that both 
banks may suffer a free riding problem. Therefore, the bank i’s gross profit depends on 
what other bank do. The profit profile for bank i is: 
(44) 1Π  : , 1 1 1 1( ) ( )2 2
S S L L t t
i i it t t t
s sR x b r x R rµπ + + + += − − = −  if (both) screen 
        2Π  : , 1 1 1 12 2
N S L L t t
i i it t t t
s sR x r x R rπ + + + += − = −  if not screen but other bank screens 
        3Π  : , 1 1 1 1( ) ( )2 2
S N L L t t
i i it t t t
s sR x b r x R rµπ + + + +Φ= Φ − − = −  if screen but others not   
        4Π  : , 1 1 1 12 2
N N L L t t
i i it t t t
s sR x r x R rπ + + + +Φ= Φ − = −   if both do not screen 
Proposition 5: The following relationship holds: 2 1 4 3Π > Π > Π > Π . 
Proof: See Appendix C.5. 
      Suppose a duopoly bank is engaged in screening and hence discriminates in favor of 
high quality firms at the expense of paying the screening cost, b. As soon as the high 
quality firms are revealed, an outside bank observes the result immediately as the  
information externality is high. Then, an outside bank offers a lower lending rate to the 
screened, high quality firms. Of course, as the screened, high quality firms want to 
borrow at the lowest cost, they contract with the outside bank, which offers lower 
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lending rates. Hence, the screening bank cannot recover screening cost and will have a 
loss.  
      In this situation, the optimal strategy of a duopoly bank is to wait and see the 
outcomes of the other bank’s screening activities, just as it was in a similar situation with 
competitive banks. In Nash equilibrium, hence, a duopoly bank has no incentive to be 
engaged in screening activities, and wants to diversify risk by lending to as many firms 
as possible. In other words, a duopoly bank faces the free riding problem and it, in turn, 
leads to no screening equilibrium.  
Definition 5: A strategy profile 1 2( , )
m mz z z∗ ∗∗ =  constitutes a Nash equilibrium for 
duopoly banks if for every j=1,2., 0jπ = 63  and ( , ) ( , )m m m mj j j jz z z zπ π∗ ∗ ∗− −′≥  for all 
m
j jz Z′ ∈ .  
Proposition 6: The unique Nash equilibrium of the duopoly banking industry is 
1 1
1 2( , )z z z
∗ =  if *ξ ξ> , i.e. no banks are engaged in screening activities. 
Proof: See Appendix C.6 
     The Nash equilibrium in the duopoly banking system is identical to that in the 
competitive banking system. This result can be extended to the oligopoly (N>2) model.  
 
                                                 
63 In Bertrand competition, each bank charges the competitive price, i.e. 
* *
, ,1 1
L L t
i jt t
rR R+ += = Φ . Hence, in 
equilibrium, banks do not make profits 
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4.2.2 Screening Equilibrium 
 
      In Nash equilibrium, all duopoly banks participate in screening activities if *ξ ξ< as 
the screening cost is less than the investment loss from not screening. As the payoffs of 
duopoly banks are higher when they engage in screening activities, the best strategy for 
duopoly banks is to screen all firms in the case of a low information externality. The 
point is that the banks do not suffer free riding problem if information externality in the 
banking industry is less than the critical level of the information externality. 
Proposition 7: The unique Nash equilibrium of the duopoly banking industry is 
2 2
1 2( , )z z z
∗ =  if *ξ ξ< . 
Proof. See Appendix C.7. 
     As with the no screening equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium in the duopoly banking 
system is identical to that in the competitive banking system. In addition, this result will 
be extended to the oligopoly model, too. Hence, the duopoly model converges to 
competitive model. In this context, setting N>1 allows us to consider a competitive 
banking system.64   
 
                                                 
64 Note that although the Nash equilibrium of duopoly banks is no screening, they know that full screening 
equilibrium is better. Hence, if they commit to coordination for getting screening equilibrium, in aggregate, 
their payoffs converge to .full screening equilibrium. For example, if one bank deviates and is not engaged 
in screening activity, the payoffs of whole banking industry is 2 3Π +Π , which is less than 12Π . This 
result can also be extended to N>2 banks oligopoly model. For the details, see Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) 
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4.3. Monopoly Banking Industry 
 
      In this economy, there is only one bank, a monopoly bank, who tries to maximize its 
profit. Unlike the competitive bank, a monopoly bank can make positive profits. Since a 
monopoly bank does not face any free-riding threat and by assumption of µ > Φ , he will 
screen all firms. As a result of screening, he lends only to high quality firms. Hence, 
total volume of credit issued by a monopoly bank at time t+1 is total savings minus 
screening cost as seen in Proposition 1. Hence, 1
S
t tX Sµ+ = . This credit will be turned 
into productive capital, as mentioned, i.e. 1t tK Sµ+ = . With a unit mass of population, 
t tS s= . Hence, the equilibrium capital-labor ratio is same as in the monopolistically 
competitive banking system, given by 1 1( )t ts kµ − += Φ .  
      The profit maximization problem of a monopoly bank is: 
(45)                                     
{ }
1 1
L
t t t t
st
R s r sMax µ + +−  
where 1
L
tR +  and 1tr +  are well defined demand and supply schedules of capital. This 
problem is identical to the problem of competitive market under *ξ ξ< . The main 
difference is how the deposit rate is determined. A monopoly bank chooses the interest 
rate on deposits in order to maximize her profit, while in a competitive banking system, 
this rate is determined by the banks’ zero profits condition. Recall that under a monopoly 
banking system, total credit supplied to firms is less than total savings from old 
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generation, due to screening cost. However, it has a higher expected return per credit. Of 
course, a monopoly bank has to pay back depositors for savings, st. 
      The equilibrium in the credit market is determined by the solution of the bank’s 
profits maximizing problem, expressed in equation (45). After substituting and 
rearranging, the bank’s problem is given by   
(46)                     
t+1{k }
1 1
1 1 1
t 1 1
1( ) [ 1] ( )Max t t tk k k kµ µ
α−
γ− γ − −α α+1 + += Φ γ − Φ (1− γ) − Φβ                                       
The first order condition in the monopoly credit market at any time t, and the dynamic 
equilibria satisfy 
(47)                        
1 1
1 1
2 1
1 1
1
1
[ ]1( )
1]
t t
t
t t
k k
k
k k
γ
γ
γ
µ
γ
µ
− −
+− α+
− α+
Φ(1− γ) − α=  β   [Φ (1− γ) − 
               
This shows the equilibrium law of motion for the per capita capital stock, k, under a 
monopolistic banking system. (See Appendix C.8) 
      Table IX compares the equilibrium law of motion in each banking system. In 
competitive and duopoly banking system, banks engage in screening when the degree of 
information externality is low, while they do not engage in screening when the degree of 
information externality is high. However, a monopoly bank engages in screening 
regardless of the degree of information externality. As mentioned, the right hand side of 
each equation implies the marginal cost of each banking system and the left hand side 
implies the marginal revenue of each banking system. 
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Table IX 
Comparison of Equilibrium Law of Motion 
Market 
Structure 
Optimal 
Strategy 
Equilibrium Law of Motion 
Screening 
(Low ξ ) 
1 1
1
t 1
1
1
[ 1]1( )
[ 1]
t t
t t
k kk
k k α
µµγ
µ
γ −
γ−1 +α+1
γ −
+
 Φ(1− γ) − =  β  Φ(1− γ) − 
 
Competitive 
& 
Duopoly No Screening 
(High ξ ) 
1 2 1
1
t 1
2 1
1
[ 1]1( )
[ 1]
t t
t t
k kk
k k α
γ
γ −
γ−1 +α+1
γ −
+
 Φ (1− γ) − Φ =  β  Φ (1− γ) − 
 
Monopoly 
Screening 
(rain or shine) 
1 1
1 1
2
t 1
1
1
[ ]1( )
[ 1]
t t
t t
k k
k
k k α
µαγ
µ
γ − −
+γ−1 α+1
γ −
+
Φ(1− γ) − =  β   Φ(1− γ) − 
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5. COMPARISON OF STEADY STATE LEVEL OF CAPITAL 
 
      Now, I compare the long-run equilibria of two distinctive economies: monopoly and 
competitive market. The long-run capital stock in a duopoly banking system is the same 
as the one that obtained from a competitive banking system, as I derived in previous 
section. Specifically, I compare the long-run equilibrium of capital obtained in a 
competitive banking system versus a monopoly banking system. In addition, I compare 
it under both a high information externality and a low information externality. A 
competitive bank has a no screening equilibrium in the case of a high information 
externality, while it has a screening equilibrium in the case of low information 
externality, as analyzed. Henceforth, the no-screening equilibrium is called the 
equilibrium in a competitive banking system, while screening equilibrium is called the 
equilibrium in a monopolistically competitive banking system.  Next section analyzes 
how the degree of information externality affects bank’s behavior and its long run 
equilibrium of capital.  
 
5.1. Steady State Level of Capital Stock 
 
Definition 6: Let Ck , MCk  and Mk be the steady state level of capital for an economy 
with a competitive, a monopolistically competitive and a monopoly banking system, 
respectively, such that   
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(48)                           
1 2
C 1
2
[ 1]1( )
[ 1]
C
C
kk
k α
γ−1
γ−1 α
γ−1
 Φ (1− γ) − Φγ =  β  Φ (1− γ) − 
     *( )ξ ξ>          
(49)                          
1
MC 1
11( )
[ 1]
MC
MC
kk
k α
µµ
µ
γ−1
γ−1 α
γ−1
 Φ (1− γ) − γ =  β  Φ (1− γ) − 
    *( )ξ ξ<               
(50)                           
1 1
1
2 1
1
1
[ ]1( )
1]
M
M
M
k
k
k
γ
γ
γ
µ
γ
µ
− −
− α
− α
Φ(1− γ) − α=  β   [Φ (1− γ) − 
      ( )ξ∀                               
      The left-hand side of each equation denotes the marginal revenue (MR) of lending 
assets for a bank, while the right-hand side refers to the marginal cost (MC) of lending 
assets for a bank. Each equation shows that in equilibrium, marginal revenue will be 
equal to the marginal cost.   
Proposition 8: There is unique steady state equilibrium under each of the banking 
market structures considered. 
Proof. See Appendix C.9 
      In next section, I will compare the steady state level of capital stock in a competitive 
banking system with that in a monopoly banking system under different degrees of 
information externality.    
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5.2. Comparison of Steady State Level of Capital Stock 
 
      Let us compare screening equilibrium with no screening equilibrium in a competitive 
banking system. This analysis gives us insight how long run equilibrium changes as 
information externality increases.  
Proposition 9: Under a competitive banking system, the screening equilibrium yields a 
higher steady state level of capital than a no-screening equilibrium, i.e. C MCk k< . 
Proof. See Appendix C.10   
      Proposition 9 implies that the steady state level of capital decreases as information 
externality increases under a competitive banking system. It supports the conventional 
wisdom which suggests that the market equilibrium is generally inefficient in the 
presence of externalities.65 As mentioned, information obtained by a bank has been 
transmitted more rapidly than ever among banks. This, in turn, is leading to a substantial 
information externality.  
 
5.2.1. Low Information Externality 
 
Proposition 10: In the case of low information externality ( *ξ ξ< ), a monopolistically 
competitive banking system leads to a higher steady state level of capital than a 
                                                 
65 When there is an information externality, the distinguishing characteristic of the mixed strategy is delay 
and duplication. And if banks fail to internalize the value of externality, banks invest less, which implies 
no screening in this paper. Mergers and acquisitions are suggested as one of the solutions for the 
externalities problem. For the details, see Coase (1960) and Hendricks and Porter (1996).   
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monopoly banking system if the degree of financial markets developments is higher than 
the degree of capital intensity, i.e. MC Mk k>  if µ γ> . 
Proof. See Appendix C.11. 
      Intuitively, if both competitive banks and a monopoly bank are participating in 
screening activities, then the advantage of allocative efficiency in the monopoly banking 
system will be washed away. In this case, the loss in output associated with the typical 
rent extraction activities of a monopoly bank generally leads to inefficiency in the  
economy. Therefore, in the low information externality case and with a well-developed 
financial market system, the long run equilibrium of per capita capital stock is higher in 
the competitive banking system.  
      Let us think about the condition of µ γ>  more carefully. What I label as the degree 
of financial market development, µ, represents the level of screening cost in the financial 
industry, while the degree of capital intensity, γ , is an indicator of the elasticity of 
capital demand. For countries with a bank-based financial system66, banks have a pivotal 
role in terms of getting society’s saving to firms, exerting corporate control, and 
providing risk management tools. Under this financial system, as firms depend heavily 
                                                 
66 The World Bank classifies financial systems into bank-based and market-based financial systems, based 
on a conglomerate index of financial structure. This index is based on measure of size, activity and 
efficiency.   See details, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001). In market-based financial systems such as the 
United States and United Kingdom, securities markets share center stage with banks in terms of getting 
society’s saving to firms, exerting corporate control, and providing risk management tools. In this market 
system, as firms have various sources of fund, they show high elasticity of capital demand. However, in 
some circumstances – particularly involving inter-temporal risk sharing, market based systems will not do 
a good job. See Allen and Gale (2000).  
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on banks, the elasticity of capital demand is relatively low. For the countries with 
market-based financial systems such as the United States and United Kingdom, 
securities markets share center stage with banks in terms of getting society’s saving to 
firms, exerting corporate control, and providing risk management tools. In this market 
system, as firms have various sources of fund, they show a high elasticity of capital 
demand.  
      Hence, the industrial countries with bank-based financial system such as Japan and 
Germany might be satisfied with this condition, e.g. see Table II for country 
classification in terms of income, financial market developments and types of financial 
market systems. 
Corollary 1: A monopoly banking system has higher steady state level of capital stock  
than a monopolistically competitive banking system only if the degree of financial 
market developments is much lower (the cost of screening much higher) than the degree 
of capital intensity, i.e. MC Mk k<  only if µ γ<< .  
Proof. See Appendix C.11.  
      Corollary 1, arising from proposition 10 implies that a monopoly banking system has 
higher long-run equilibrium than a monopolistically competitive banking system only if 
the elasticity of capital demand is much higher than financial market development. As 
mentioned, industrial countries with market-based financial system such as United States 
and United Kingdom might satisfy this condition.  
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      However, the condition γ µ>>  is a necessary condition, not sufficient. 67  The 
economic intuition for γ µ>>  to be a necessary condition is that even if the elasticity of 
capital demand is higher than the degree of financial markets development (lower thus 
screening cost), a competitive banking system might perform better in the case of lower 
information externalities.  
      The above analysis suggests that under the low information externality, a 
competitive banking system performs better when µ γ> . However, if the elasticity of 
capital demand is much higher than financial markets development, a monopoly banking 
system might lead to higher capital accumulation. For industrial countries with market-
based financial systems, hence, a monopoly banking system is good for leading to a 
higher steady state level of capital. This result may provide an explanation for the recent 
flurry mergers and acquisitions in the industrial countries.  
 
                                                 
67 The sufficient condition is that the marginal cost in the monopoly banking system, MCM is strictly lower 
than that in the competitive banking system, MCMC. For example, even though the marginal revenue in the 
monopoly banking system is much higher than that in the competitive banking system, it is still possible 
that the intersection point in monopoly bank 1Mk
γ − is higher than that in monopolistically competitive bank 
1
MCk
γ −  if RHSMC is strictly lower than RHSM, i.e. 1 1M MCk k
γ γ− −> . This means that the steady state level of 
capital in monopolistically competitive banking system is higher, i.e.  * *M MCk k<  since 1γ < . But if 
RHSM is strictly lower than RHSMC, then 
1 1
M MCk k
γ γ− −<  if the slope of  1Mk γ −  in LHSM is steeper than that 
of 1MCk
γ − in LHSMC. This means that the steady state level of capital in monopoly banking system is higher, 
i.e.  * *M MCk k>  
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5.2.2. High Information Externality 
 
      As mentioned, the degree of information externality has been recently increased 
substantially as information technology advances. This section analyzes long-run 
equilibrium under high information externality.   
Proposition 11: In the case of high information externality *( )ξ ξ> , a monopoly 
banking system has a better performance in reaching a higher steady state level of capital 
than a competitive banking system if the proportion of high quality firms is low, i.e. 
M Ck k>  if γ > Φ . 
Proof. See Appendix C.12. 
          Proposition 11 shows that if the proportion of high quality firms were relatively 
low, the loss in output associated with lending capital to lower quality firms would be 
high. Then the value added by screening activities would be large enough to compensate 
for the loss in output associated with the typical rent extraction activity of the monopoly. 
Note that a monopoly bank is engaged in screening, while competitive banks are not due 
to the free riding problem. Especially for the developing countries, hence, a monopoly 
banking system is better to accelerate economic growth. 
      Taking consideration of the condition of γ > Φ , we can find that the countries with 
highly developed financial markets might satisfy the condition. Since firms in a highly 
developed financial market have various sources of funding, they show the high 
elasticity of capital demand. Hence, a monopoly banking system is more effective in 
promoting growth in a country with highly developed financial markets. This result 
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supports mergers and acquisition in the developing countries and regions having highly 
developed financial markets.  
Corollary 2: In the case of high information externality, the competitive banking system 
has higher steady state level of capital than the monopoly banking system if the 
proportion of high quality firms is much higher than the elasticity of capital demand, i.e. 
M Ck k<  only if γΦ >> .  
Proof.  See Appendix C.12. 
      Above corollary, arising from Proposition 11, implies that a competitive banking 
system might be better for countries with under-developed financial market such as 
ASEAN68. ASEAN countries have recently grown so fast that the proportion of high 
quality firms has been increasing. However, the capital markets such as bonds and stocks 
markets are under-developed and they show relatively closed economies in that they 
have restraints on accessing international financial markets. They have suffered chronic 
excess capital demand, which implies that the elasticity of capital demand is low. These 
economies satisfy the condition that the proportion of high quality firms is much higher 
than the elasticity of capital demand.  
                                                 
68 ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was established at August 1967 in Bangkok by 
the five original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.  
Brunei Darussalam joined at January 1984, Vietnam at July 1995, Laos and Myanmar at July 1997, and 
Cambodia at April 1999. The Objectives are: (i) to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and 
cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order 
to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations, and (ii) 
to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the 
relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter. 
See ASEAN Annual Report 2002-2003. 
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      As in Corollary 1, however, the condition γΦ >>  is a necessary condition, not 
sufficient. An economic intuition for γΦ >>  to be necessary condition implies that a 
monopoly banking system performs better even if above condition holds. This suggests 
that in general a monopoly banking system is better under high information externality. 
 
5.2.3. The Critical Level of Information Externality 
 
      To analyze the effect of information externality on comparative advantage of each 
market system, I define ξ%  as a critical level of information externality, which equates 
the payoffs in the monopoly banking system to that in the competitive banking system.   
Proposition 12: There exists a critical level of information externality, ξ%  such that, for 
any , , , ,α β γ µΦ  in their admissible ranges,  ( ) ( )M Ck kξ ξ=% %  and ( ) ( )M Ck kξ ξ>  for 
ξ ξ> %  and  ( ) ( )M Ck kξ ξ<  for ξ ξ< %  if and only if 0µ γ> > Φ > . 
Proof. See Appendix C.13  
      Proposition 12 implies that as the information externality increases, a concentrated 
banking system may lead to a higher output for the economy. As seen in Proposition 3, 
competitive banks will retreat from engaging in screening activities as the degree of 
information externality increases. Hence, the allocative efficiency in the monopoly 
banking system dominates the loss in output associated with the rent extraction activities 
from monopoly banking system as the information externality increases.  
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      As mentioned, advances in the financial infrastructure such as the credit evaluating 
system, networking and communication mean that it is easier for banks to access the 
information on firm’s quality. Moreover, as banks disclose their financial statements 
more frequently and in a timely manner, the degree of information externality has been 
highly increased. This change implies that a monopolistic banking system has 
comparative advantage for promoting economic growth only if 0µ γ> > Φ > .   
 
5.3 Comparative Statics 
 
      In previous section, I showed that under the assumption of low screening cost, 
monopolistic banking system is more effective to lead to higher steady state level of 
capital both in the developing countries and in the industrial countries. In this section, I 
perform comparative static. Comparative static analysis gives us insights for how the 
equilibrium condition varies as the other parameters of the economy change.  
 
5.3.1. Low Information Externality 
 
      In the case of low information externality, we can compare equation (49) and (50) to 
perform comparative static. From Proposition 10 and Corollary 1, we know that the 
comparative advantage between the competitive banking system and the monopoly 
banking system may vary as the degree of financial market developments. Hence, let me 
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first look at the effect of the screening technology on competitive advantage of each 
market system.  
   
5.3.1.1 Financial Markets Development µ  
 
      Let *µ  be a critical value of the level of financial market developments, which 
equates the steady state level of capital stock in the monopoly banking system to that in 
the competitive banking system. 
Proposition 13: There exists a *µ  such that, for any , , ,α β γ µ  in their admissible 
ranges, * *( ) ( )M MCk kµ µ=  and ( ) ( )M MCk kµ µ>  for *µ µ<  and ( ) ( )M MCk kµ µ≤ for  
*µ µ>  if and only if * (0, 1)γ µ> ∈ . 
Proof. See Appendix C.14 
      Proposition 13 implies that as the financial markets advance, the competitive 
banking system may produce a higher output in the case of lower information externality. 
Intuitively, competitive banks can easily access information on firm’s quality without 
screening as financial markets advance. Then, the advantage of allocative efficiency in 
the monopoly banking system will be diminishing. Instead, the loss in output associated 
with typical rent extraction activities of a monopoly bank leads to inefficiency of 
economy. However, if the financial markets are under-developed, a monopoly bank has 
a competitive advantage in acquiring and processing information on firm’s quality.   
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      To explore the effect of changes in parameters on the relative advantage between 
monopolistic banking system and competitive banking system, let me define the 
difference function, 1∆  as follows: 1 M MCk k∆ = − . We know from Proposition 10 and 
Corollary 1 that 1 0∆ >  as γ µ   and 2 0∆ <  as γ µ< . In order for the difference 
function, 1∆  to be continuous function in µ , hence, *γ µ>  must be held. Let 
* 1 * 1 *
1 ( ) ( )M MCk k k
γ γµ µ− −= = . Then, **1 1( , , , , , )kµ α β γ∆ Φ  can be rewritten by 
(51) 
*1
* **
1
*
*
1 *
*
1 1 1
*
1
1
(1 ) (
1
( , , , , , ) ( )
( (1 ) 1)
1( ) 1)
0
k
k k
k
α
α
γ µαµ α β γ γ µ γ β µ γ
µΦ − −∆ Φ = − −
Φ − −
 − −   =       
 
 
5.3.1.2. The Effect of Φ  on *µ  
 
      Now let us explore that how the critical level of screening technology changes to be 
equating the steady state level of capital stock in both banking systems as the proportion 
of high quality firms increases. In other words, I investigate how *µ  varies as Φ  
changes, i.e. 
*µ∂
∂Φ . As 
*µ is not written explicitly as a function of Φ , I derive the effect 
by applying the implicit function theorem on 1∆ . That is,  
(52)                             1
*
*
1
*
1 1
/
/ µ
µ
µ
Φ∆∂ ∂∆ ∂Φ= − = −∂Φ ∂∆ ∂ ∆  
First, let me differentiate the difference function 1∆  with respect to Φ , then 
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(53)   
* *1
1
1
1
*
1
* *
1
1
1
(1 (1 )
{ (1 ) 1}
1) (1 ) ( ) 1k
k
k
α
α
α
α
β
µ γ
µ γ
γ µα
+
− −∂∆ = −∂Φ Φ − −
  Φ − − +            
 
The sign of 1∂∆∂Φ  is positive as 0 1α< < . Recall that α  denote the shape of saving 
supply schedule. For example, α =1 means horizontal supply schedule and α =0 means 
vertical supply schedule.69  It is obvious, intuitively. If the saving supply is inelastic, the 
negative effect of rent extraction becomes smaller. In this case, the relative advantage of 
a monopoly bank is enlarged as the proportion of high quality firm increases.  
      Next, differentiating 1∆  with respect to *µ , we have    
22 * *
1
1 1
1*
2 * *
2* * *
*1
1
*
1
(1 ) (1 )
1
{ (1 ) 1}
1 1 1 1 1 1( ) 1 ( 1)k k
k
k
α
α
α
γ γ
γµ β µ γ
µ µα α µ α µ µ
+
−Φ − Φ −∂∆ = − −∂ Φ − −
   + − + + + − −                 
 
Let * *1 1(1 ) ( )C γ µ µα α
 = Φ − + −   and * *
1 1 1(1 ) 1 ( 1)F γ µ α µ
 = Φ − + + −   . Note that 
C>0 and F>0. Then, above equation can be rewritten as  
(54)     
2* *
1
1 1
1*
2*
*1
1
*
1
(1 )
1
{ (1 ) 1}
1
C k k
k
k
F
α
α
α
γ
γµ β µ γ
µ
+
− Φ −∂∆ = − −∂ Φ − −
 + −           
.  
                                                 
69 From equation (35), we can easily derive the elasticity of saving supply. Let ,r s
s r
r s
ε ∂≡ ∂ . Then 
, (1 )r s
w s
s
αε α
−≡ − . Hence, , as 1r sε α→ ∞ →   and  , 0 as 0r sε α→ → . 
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It is strictly negative if 
2 2
2 2* *
*
4 (1 ) 4 (1 )
2 (1 ) 2 (1 )
C CF F F F
k
C C
γ γ
µ µ
γ γ
Φ − Φ −− − + −
< <Φ − Φ − . Intuitively, 
it is obvious. As shown in the previous section, in the case of low information externality, 
the competitive advantage of monopolistic banking system is diminishing as the 
financial markets advance. This is consistent with historical evidences. For example, see 
e.g. Cetorelli (1997).  
      Hence, 
*
0µ∂ >∂Φ  if 
2 2
2 2* *
*
4 (1 ) 4 (1 )
2 (1 ) 2 (1 )
C CF F F F
k
C C
γ γ
µ µ
γ γ
Φ − Φ −− − + −
< <Φ − Φ − . That is, 
the critical level of degree of financial markets development grows as the proportion of 
high quality firm increases in the case of low information externality. The economic 
meaning for a higher critical level of financial markets development is that an economy 
will benefit more from a monopoly banking system. It is due to over-investment of 
information system as all competitive banks are engaged in the screening activities. The 
excess demand for information on firms’ quality causes inefficiency of the economy and 
this inefficiency dominates inefficiency associated with rent extraction behavior by a 
monopoly bank.  
      In the case of low information externality, hence, a monopoly banking system has 
better performance for reaching higher steady state level of capital as the proportion of 
high quality firms increases. It is the opposite result of previous literatures which 
conclude that a competitive banking system is better for the industrial countries.  
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5.3.1.3 The Effect of Degree of Capital Intensity, γ  on *µ  
 
      Now let us explore that how the critical level of financial markets development 
varies as the degree of capital intensity of technology γ  changes. Note that the degree of 
capital intensity of technology can be interpreted by an indicator of the elasticity of 
capital demand. From this analysis, hence, I will answer the following question: Is a 
competitive banking system better for capital-intense countries (mainly industrial 
countries) or labor-intense countries (mainly developing countries)? Moreover, which 
banking system performs better if a country has a high (low) elasticity of capital demand?   
      To investigate how *µ  varies as γ  changes, i.e. 
*µ
γ
∂
∂ , I also apply the implicit 
function theorem on 1∆ .  
(55)                             1
*
*
1
*
1 1
/
/
γ
µ
µ γ
γ µ
∆∂ ∂∆ ∂= − = −∂ ∂∆ ∂ ∆  
 Similarly, we can obtain the sign of equation (55).  
(56)  
1 *
1
1
* * *
1
* *1
1
* *
1
1 1
( ) (1 ) ( 1) 1}1
(2 )
{ (1 ) 1}
{k k
k
k
α
α
α
µ µ γα αγ µγ β µ γ
+
− Φ − − +∂∆ = − −∂ Φ − −
 Φ         
 
The sign of equation (56) is strictly negative if * 2µ γ> 70 . This implies that the 
comparative advantage of the monopoly banking system will be diminishing as the 
                                                 
70 If * 2µ γ< , the sign of equation (56) is ambiguous as first term of (56) shows positive, but second term 
shows negative.   
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economy has higher elasticity of capital demand. Intuitively, it is obvious. The negative 
repercussion on capital formation, associated with rent extraction activity in the 
monopolistic banking system, becomes worse as an economy has higher elasticity of 
capital demand. This result is consistent with historical evidence.  
      Let us look at the condition of * 2µ γ>  more carefully. The meaning of the 
extremely high critical value of the financial markets development implies that a 
monopoly banking system is more likely to lead to higher steady state level of capital 
stock. From equation (54), we know that *1 0µ∆ <  if  
2 2
2 2* *
*
4 4
2 (1 ) 2 (1 )
C CF F F F
k
C C
µ µ
γ γ
− − + −
< <Φ − Φ − .   
Hence,
*
0µγ
∂ <∂  if 
* 2µ γ>  and 
2 2
2 2* *
*
4 4
2 (1 ) 2 (1 )
C CF F F F
k
C C
µ µ
γ γ
− − + −
< <Φ − Φ − . In other words, 
the critical level of the financial markets development decreases as the elasticity of 
capital demand increases. This means that economy benefits more from competitive 
banking system as the elasticity of capital demand increases. In general, countries with 
bank-based financial markets system such as Japan and Germany have a relatively low 
elasticity of capital demand than countries with market based financial markets system 
such as United States and United Kingdom. Hence, this result gives some empirical 
implications about whether the effect of a concentrated banking system on real economic 
activities will differ among countries with different financial markets system.   
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5.3.2. High Information Externality 
 
      In the case of high information externality, we can compare equation (48) and (50) to 
perform comparative static. From Proposition 11 and Corollary 2, we know that the 
comparative advantage between the competitive banking system and the monopoly 
banking system varies as the proportion of high quality firms in the economy changes. 
Firstly, let us look at the effect of the proportion of high quality firm on competitive 
advantage of each market system.  
 
5.3.2.1 The Proportion of High Quality Firms, Ф 
 
      Let *Φ  be a critical value of the proportion of high quality firms, which equate the 
steady state level of capital stock in the monopoly banking system to that in the 
competitive banking system. 
Proposition 14: There exists a *Φ  such that, for any , , ,α β γ µ  in their admissible 
ranges, * *( ) ( )M Ck kΦ = Φ  and ( ) ( )M Ck kΦ > Φ  for *Φ < Φ  and ( ) ( )M Ck kΦ ≤ Φ for  
*Φ > Φ  if and only if * (0, 1)γ < Φ ∈ . 
Proof. See Appendix C.15 
      Proposition 14 implies that as the proportion of high quality firms increases, the 
competitive banking system may produce a higher output for the economy. Intuitively, 
the advantage of allocative efficiency in the monopoly banking system will be 
diminishing as high quality firm increases. In this case, the loss in output associated with 
 84 
typical rent extraction activities of a monopoly bank dominates the advantage of 
allocative efficiency. This, in turn leads to inefficiency of economy.  
      To explore the effect of changes in parameters on the relative advantage between 
monopolistic banking system and competitive banking system, let me define the 
difference function, 2∆  as follows: 2 M Ck k∆ = − . We know from Proposition 13 that 
2 0∆ >  as γ > Φ  and 2 0∆ <  as γ << Φ . In order for the difference function, 2∆  to be 
continuous function in Φ , hence, *γ < Φ  must be held. Let * 1 * 1 *2 ( ) ( )M Ck k kγ γ− −= Φ = Φ . 
Then, * *2 2( , , , , , )k α β γ µ∆ Φ  can be rewritten by 
(57) 
1
2
*
1 1
2
*
* 1
* *2
* * * 2
2 2 2
* * * *
2 2
(1 )
1 (1 ) 1
( , , , , , ) ( ) 0
( (1 ) 1) ( (1 ) 1)
k k
k k
k k
α
α α
γ µ γαα β γ µ γ γ β µ γ γ
−Φ − − Φ − −∆ Φ = −Φ − − =
Φ − − Φ − −
           
 
 
5.3.2.2. The Effect of the Financial Markets Development, µ on *Φ  
 
      Now let us explore that how the critical level of high quality firm’s ratio changes to 
be equating the steady state level of capital stock in both banking system as the financial 
markets develop. In other words, I investigate how *Φ  varies as µ  changes, i.e. 
*
µ
∂Φ
∂ .  
      As *Φ is not written explicitly as a function of µ , I derive the effect by applying the 
implicit function theorem on 2∆ . That is,  
 85 
(58)                             
*
22
*
2 2
/
/
µµ
µ Φ
∆∂Φ ∂∆ ∂= − = −∂ ∂∆ ∂Φ ∆  
First, let me differentiate the difference function ∆  with respect to µ , then 
(59)              
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* * 21
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α
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+
  Φ −Φ − − − −   ∂∆   = −   ∂   Φ − −   
 
Equation (59) is strictly positive if *2 *
( 1)
(1 )
k α αµ γ
+> Φ − . Intuitively, it is apparent. The 
allocative efficiency of a monopoly bank enlarges as screening technology advances. 
Hence, the relative advantage of a monopoly banking system is positively correlated 
with the screening technology. 
      Next, let us differentiate 2∆  with respect to *Φ , we have    
(60) 
1
1 1*
2*
1 1
21 * *
*
*
* * * *2
2 2
*2
2
* * *
2 2
* * *
2 2 2
* * *
2 2
(1 ) 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )1
{ (1 ) 1} { (1 ) 1}
(1 ) { (1 ) 1} 2{ (1 ) 1}1
{
1 (1 )2
1(1 ) (1 )
k
k k
k k
k k k
k
k k
α
α
α α
α
α α
α
γ µ γ γα αγ β µ γ γ
µ γ γ γαγ β µ
α
µ
γα
+
+
− − Φ − Φ −∂∆ = − − −∂Φ Φ − − Φ − −
− Φ − − Φ − −
= − −
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 −          
−  − Φ −   1 12** *
2 2(1 ) 1} { (1 ) 1}k k
α
α αγ γ
+
− − Φ − −
      
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Equation (60) is strictly negative if *2 *
1
(1 )
k µ γ> Φ −
71.  It is also obvious, intuitively. The 
relative advantage of a monopoly banking system is diminishing as Φ  increases.  
      Therefore, 
*
0µ
∂Φ >∂  if 
*
2 * *
1 ( 1)max[ , ]
(1 ) (1 )
k α αµ γ µ γ
+> Φ − Φ − . This result can be 
interpreted that the critical level of high quality firm’s ratio increases as the financial 
markets advance. The economic meaning for higher critical level of high quality firm’s 
ratio is that the economy benefits more from a monopoly banking system. Hence, the 
monopoly banking system has a better performance in reaching higher steady state level 
of capital as the financial markets advances.  
 
5.3.2.3 The Effect of the Elasticity of Capital Demand, γ  on *Φ  
 
      Now let us explore that how the critical level of high quality firm’s ratio varies as the 
degree of capital intensity of technology, γ , changes. To investigate how *Φ  varies as 
γ  changes, i.e. 
*
γ
∂Φ
∂ , I also apply the implicit function theorem on 2∆ . Then,  
(61)                             
*
22
2 2
/
/
γγ
γ Φ
∆∂Φ ∂∆ ∂= − = −∂ ∂∆ ∂Φ ∆  
Similarly, we can obtain the sign of equation (61).  
                                                 
71 Equation (60) is strictly negative if  ( ) ( )1 1* 2 *2 2(1 ) (1 ) 1 2 (1 ) 1k k αα αµ γ γ µ γα
+
− Φ − − < Φ − −  
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(62)  
1 *
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1 1
2* *
2 2
2* * * *2
2 2
* *
(1 )1 1
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1( 1)
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k
k k
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µ γαγγ β µ γ γα
+
−∂∆ = −Φ −∂ Φ − − Φ − −
    − Φ −      
 
Note that *Φ  should be greater than γ , as seen in Proposition 11. The sign of equation 
(62) is ambiguous. However, a careful examination shows that all else equal, the sign of 
2γ∆ is negative if * 2γΦ >  and *2 * 1(1 )k µ γ> Φ − . If 
* 2γ γ< Φ <  and *2 * 1(1 )k µ γ< Φ − , the 
sign of equation (62) is strictly positive. Combined with equation (60) which shows 
strictly negative sign if *2 *
1
(1 )
k µ γ> Φ − .  
      Hence, 
*
0γ
∂Φ <∂  if 
* 2γΦ >  and *2 * 1(1 )k µ γ> Φ − . Let us look at the condition of 
* 2γΦ >  more carefully. The meaning of the extremely high critical level of high quality 
firm’s ratio implies that the monopolistic banking system has more likely to lead to 
higher steady state level of capital stock. Hence, we can conclude that the negative 
repercussion on capital formation, associated with rent extraction activity in the 
monopolistic banking system becomes worse as an economy has a higher elasticity of 
capital demand. This result is consistent with historical evidences.  
      As developing countries have low elasticity of capital demand, the monopolistic 
banking system is more effective to accelerate economic growth. However, the industrial 
countries have usually high elasticity of capital demand, their governments should take 
an additional measures such as setting guidelines on interest rates on deposits and loans 
to reduce negative effect of rent extraction activities of monopolistic banks.  
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      Table X summarizes the result of comparative statics. In the case of a low degree of 
information externality, a monopoly banking system performs better as the proportion of 
high quality firms increases, however, competitive banking system is better as the 
elasticity of capital demand increases. 
      In the case of a high degree of information externality, a monopoly banking system 
has better performanceas the financial markets advance. 
      
Table X 
Results of Comparative Statics 
 
Information 
Externality 
Focus 
Comparative 
Static 
Economic Meaning 
*
0µ∂ >∂Φ  
Monopoly banking system might be better as high 
quality firms increase 
- Over-Investment of Information System by  
    the Competitive banking system  
Low 
*( )ξ ξ<  µ
* 
*
0µγ
∂ <∂  
Competitive banking system may be better as the 
elasticity of capital demand increases 
- Empirical Issues: 
   Under-developed & Bank-based:  Monopoly 
   Developed & Market-based: Competitive 
*
0µ
∂Φ >∂  
Monopoly banking system is better as the 
financial markets advance 
- Lower Screening Cost 
High 
*( )ξ ξ>  
*Φ  
*
0γ
∂Φ <∂   
Competitive banking system is better as the 
elasticity of capital demand increases 
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6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
      The result of this paper suggests that there appears to be some relationship between 
economic development and market structure in banking industry. It also suggests that 
there is relationship between information externality and market structure.  
      In an early stage of economic development, both financial market development (µ) 
and the proportion of high quality firms (Φ ) are likely to be low. However, they have 
high elasticity of capital demand as they have low capital demand. Hence, the following 
conditions, γ µ>  and/or γ > Φ  will be easily satisfied. Then, as shown in the 
Proposition 11 and Corollary 1, a monopolistic banking system might be more effective 
to achieve higher steady state level of capital and economic growth.  
      As economy advances, high quality firms increases. However, capital intensity of 
production function does not change much. Furthermore, if financial markets 
development falls behind economic growth, the chronic excess demand for capital will 
happen as shown in developing countries. In that case, a competitive banking system 
might be better.  
      However, as financial markets advance and information externality increases, a 
monopoly banking system regains its comparative advantage for promoting economy 
      The results of comparative static also show that a monopoly banking system has a 
comparative advantage as financial markets advance and the proportion of high quality 
firms increases. However, a competitive banking system has a comparative advantage as 
an economy shows a high elasticity of capital demand.  
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      Above results give us empirical questions whether the effect of concentrated banking 
system on real economic activities will differ among countries with different financial 
systems and different economic conditions.      
      From Proposition 10, we can infer that if there is no information externality, the 
advantage of allocation efficiency in monopoly banking system washes away. Hence, in 
this case, a competitive banking system has a better performance regardless of the 
proportion of high quality firms in the economy. But even if there is low information 
externality, a monopoly banking system might have better performance if there is an 
inefficiency associated with the asymmetric information problem between banks and 
firms. Many relationship-oriented models suggest that the merit of a concentrated 
banking system is that it is more effective to overcome the asymmetric information 
problem.  
      As seen from empirical evidence, banks have made a huge investment on networking 
and computerization to respond to the strategic uncertainty. As keeping the information 
technology “in-house” is a way to keep future options open and diversify across possible 
areas of future focus 72 , a competitive banking system leads to overinvestment on 
information technology. Hence, a concentrated banking system through the mergers and 
acquisitions can be beneficial to the economy since it gives an economy of scale as well 
as the synergy effect from information sharing. 
                                                 
72 This argument comes from the theory developed by Boot et al (1998). In this context, the enormous 
premia that have been paid in M&A would be rationalized in part by the large projected savings in 
information technology expenses by the merging banks. See Thakor (1999)     
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      This result holds under the high screening cost. For any countries whose economic 
development is relatively low and screening activities cost high, a monopolistic banking 
system is better to promote capital accumulation if the proportion of high quality firms is 
much lower. See Appendix B. 
      This paper should be considered as a first step in incorporating the level of economic 
development, financial markets development and information externality into the 
analysis of the effect of the banking market structure on the economic growth. 
Accordingly, there are a number of possible extensions.  
      First, in this model there is only a single good, there is no government sector, and 
banks are not regulated. Exploring the desirability of regulatory intervention, and 
allowing some scope for fiscal and monetary policy to affect the operation of the 
financial system would be important topics for further investigation. For example, in this 
paper, I assume that banks are owned by old agents. This assumption makes it simply to 
analyze. However, when we incorporate new agents, bank owner and bank regulator, 
into this model, we can analyze bank manager’s incentive and policy implication of bank 
regulator.  
      Second, this paper analyzes the equilibrium law of motion for capital stock under 
different banking market structures. Exploring the transitional dynamics under different 
banking market structure would be interesting for future project, too.    
      Third, whereas this paper assumes that banks and firms are identical in size among 
themselves, it would be more realistic to introduce bank and firm size as a source of 
asymmetry into the model. Asymmetric bank and firm size gives the larger bank and 
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firm a higher degree of monopoly power at the occurrence of transaction, which in turn, 
influences strategic interaction among banks and/or among firms. Pecorino (2001) 
analyzes the effect of changes in industry structure on the ability to maintain a 
cooperative equilibrium in a repeated game setting. He allows size difference among 
firms and finds the following results. When the market share of the largest firm rises 
holding the size distribution of firms within the “fringe”, the changes in cooperation 
level among firms is not determined. However, when the number of identical firms in 
the fringe increases, cooperation becomes more difficult. 
      Another extension would be to introduce stochastic property of loan applicants. In 
other words, if lower quality firms happen to apply to one bank, and good quality firms 
apply to the other bank, how we reconcile the asymmetric property of loan applicants 
each bank faces? The results are likely to be sensitive to specific assumptions concerning 
information structure such as unilateral information asymmetry.  
      It is also interesting to model endogenous meager which depends on the degree of 
information externality. There is empirical evidence that the relationship between the 
number of banks and social welfare is an inverted U-shape. This implies that neither 
competitive banking system nor monopoly banking system are not pareto-dominant. 
Although the result in this paper suggests that it depends on information externality, it 
could be interesting if the number of banks gets to be chosen depending on the degree of 
information externality.   
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
      This paper explores the effect of banking market structure on capital accumulation. 
Specifically, it explores how the degree of information externality affects the bank’s 
decision on screening activities. Based on that decision, the long-run equilibrium of 
capital stock in each banking system is derived. In addition, by comparing equilibrium 
under different banking systems, we find some relationships among economic 
development, financial market development, information externality and comparative 
advantage of a banking market structure.  
      While many theoretical studies on finance and growth have shown the importance of 
banks in fostering economic growth, little has been done in exploring the role played by 
the market structure of the banking industry. Moreover, little has investigated the 
relationship among information externality, financial markets development and market 
structure.   
      This paper shows that allocative efficiency due to screening activity is major factors 
for a monopolistic banking system to reach a better performance in accumulating capital. 
The efficient provision of screening technology is also a factor to give comparative 
advantage for monopoly banking system.  This is consistent with empirical observations. 
The banking market structure affects both the overall quantity of credit available for 
investment purposes and the allocative efficiency of the credit market. In addition, it 
affects the investment decision on screening technology. If there is a perfect information 
externality, a competitive bank suffers allocative inefficiency, compared with a 
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monopoly bank. If there is no externality, competitive banks suffer investment 
inefficiency associated with under- and/or over-investment on screening technology.  
      Moreover, a monopolistic banking system might have better performance to lead to a 
higher capital per capita as information externality grows. That implies that a 
monopolistic banking system may be a “second best” for economic growth as 
information technology develops rapidly and, as consequence of it, the information 
externality grows swiftly. 
      This result can be applied to both developing countries and industrial countries. The 
developing countries usually have a lower stage of economic development, and a low 
proportion of high quality firms. The industrial countries usually have a high stage of 
economic development but high degree of information externality. Hence, a monopoly 
banking system might lead to a better performance in capital accumulation. 
      The results presented in this paper provide an alternative explanation for the recent 
deregulation and resulting trends in mergers and acquisitions in the industrial countries 
as well as in the developing countries. It also provides a theoretical foundation to support 
the policy change observed in different countries. In other words, this result supports that 
the government’s policy changes observed are appropriate in terms of growth. 
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APPENDIX A 
INFORMATION EXTERNALITY AND CONCENTRATION IN KOREA 
 
1. Overview of Credit Management System in Korea 
     Korea established the Act on Utilization and Protection of Credit Information to 
manage credit risk and reduce the possibility of non-performing loans of financial 
institutions in 1995. In accordance to the Act, the Korea Federation of Banks (KFB) 
built the Credit Information Management Service (CIMS) to collect and distribute the 
credit information of individuals and firms. Financial institutions report credit 
information to KFB within 15 days from the occurrence of the transaction. All the 
information including the issuance of stocks and bonds and any changes in credit will be 
reported if the current credit balance of an individual exceeds 10 million Won (about 
U$8,000 as of end of January 2003) and 100 million Won for a business (about 
U$80,000). 
  - Foundation: Act on Utilization and Protection of Credit Information 
  - Objectives: To Reduce the Possibility of Non-Performing Loans 
  - Administrator: The Korea Federation of Banks 
  - Functions: Pooling and Administration of Credit Information 
  - Types and Contents of Credit Information: 
    . Type: Individuals, Firms, Non-financial Institutions 
    . Contents: borrower identification, credit delinquencies, credit 
                      transaction history, credit transaction capability  
- Operation Process: 
        Individual: 10M won (U$8,300) 
     Firm: 100M won(U$83,000) 
       Within 15 days from transaction day 
Financial 
Institutions Æ KFB Æ 
Financial Institutions 
National Tax Service 
Korea Assets Mgmt Co 
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2. The Number of Financial Institutions in Korea 
      Korea suffered bank crises in the end of 1997. In the midst of rehabilitating the 
economy, mergers and acquisitions among the financial institutions were accelerated. 
For example, the number of banks decreased to 20 as of end of 2001, from 33 just before 
the crises. The number of life insurance companies and mutual savings and finances and 
credit unions reduced to 19, 122 and 1268 from 31, 231 and 1666, respectively. More 
surprisingly, the number of merchant banking corporations decreased 90% by 3 from 30. 
Unlike other financial institutions, the number of securities companies has increased to 
46 from 36. This is attributed by capital market openness and liberalization. In addition, 
some of merchant banking corporations turned into securities companies. This shows 
how the crises change a market structure and lead to concentration. 
1998-2001 
 
Number of 
Institutions at 
the end of 1997 Exit Merger New 
Number of 
Institutions at the 
end of 2001 
Banks 33 5 8 - 20 
Merchant Banking 
Corporations 30 22 6 1 3 
Securities Companies 36 6 1 17 46 
Investment Trust 
Companies 31 6 1 6 30 
Life Insurance 
Companies 31 7 5 - 19 
Non-Life Insurance 
Companies 14 - 1 1 14 
Mutual Savings & 
Finance 231 95 26 12 122 
Credit Unions 1,666 305 102 9 1,268 
Total 2,072 446 150 46 1,522 
          Source: Bank of Korea (2002) 
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3. Deterioration of Major Economic Indicators 
      The major economic indicators have deteriorated since 1995. The GDP growth rate 
drops by 5-6% from 7-8% per annum on average. More interestingly, the ratio of 
dishonored bills and debt ratio in manufacturing sector went up after establishment of 
credit sharing system. That might be explained partly by the problem of the information 
externality and because degree of concentration was not enough. As seen in the paper, as 
information externality grows, banks will not invest the efficient level of screening 
technology when the number of banks are large enough.. Contrary to the increase in debt 
ratio, the growth rate of gross fixed capital formation has dropped sharply on average. 
     In the midst of the restructuring process, Korean Government pushed forward some 
forms to reduce debt ratio below 200 percent and introduce a “Workout” system which 
makes distressed firms to be exited or funded easily. Those measures have been very 
effective to recover the economy. 
Year GDP  Growth Rate 
Ratio of 
Dishonored Bills
Gross Fixed Capital 
Growth Rate 
Debt Ratio in 
Manufacture 
1989 6.1 0.04 15.8 - 
1990 9.0 0.04 25.9 285.52 
1991 9.2 0.06 13.3 306.68 
1992 5.4 0.12 -0.7 318.73 
1993 5.5 0.12 6.3 294.88 
1994 8.3 0.16 10.7 302.52 
1995 8.9 0.17 11.9 286.75 
1996 6.8 0.14 7.3 317.11 
1997 5.0 0.40 -2.2 396.25 
1998 -6.7 0.38 -21.2 303.02 
1999 10.9 0.33 3.7 214.64 
2000 9.3 0.26 11.4 210.57 
2001 3.1 0.23 -1.8 182.20 
2002p 6.3 0.06 4.8 135.44 
Source: Bank of Korea (2002) 
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APPENDIX B 
THE ASSUMPTION OF HIGH SCREENING COST: µ < Φ  
 
      In this appendix, I show how the results change as the cost of screening increases. In 
other words, how are the results affected when the screening cost is too high to 
compensate investment loss, i.e (1 ) (1 )µ− > − Φ .  
      First of all, notice that the no screening equilibrium performs better than the 
screening equilibrium in the competitive market if µΦ > . This can be shown in a 
straight forward way. Figure 3 shows self evident. The vertical asymptote for marginal 
cost in the competitive bank with screening, expressed in equation (49), MCMC is strictly 
higher than that in the competitive bank with no screening, expressed in equation (48), 
MCC. Hence, every point of RHSMC is strictly to the right of RHSC. If µΦ > , the slope 
of 1MCk
γ −  in marginal revenue of equation (49), MRMC is flatter than that of 1Ck
γ − in equation 
(48), MRC, which implies that 1 1MC Ck k
γ γ− −> . Note that as 1γ < , so C MCk k> . Intuitively, as 
screening activities are not value added any longer, no screening equilibrium (perfect 
information externality case) has higher steady state level of capital than screening 
equilibrium (no information externality). But this results is not consistent with the 
conventional wisdom that externality leads to inefficiency. The conventional wisdom 
suggests that if there is information externality, screening equilibrium has better 
performance than no screening equilibrium. Therefore, the assumption that screening 
cost is less than investment loss is reasonable as I mentioned. 
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             1 1C MCk k
γ γ− −<   ↔  MC Ck k<  as 1γ <  
 
 
FIGURE 3.-Equilibrium Level of Capital - Competitive Banking System with 
Information Externality if µΦ >  
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MCC 
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1
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γ −  2(1 )1/ γ−Φ
(1 )1/ γµ −Φ
1/ Φ
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      Second, the competitive banking system reaches higher steady state level of capital if 
µ < Φ . This is reverse to Proposition 11 and Corollary 2. Figure 4 shows this 
relationship graphically. The vertical asymptote for marginal cost in the competitive 
bank, expressed in equation (48), MCC is strictly lower than that in the monopoly bank, 
expressed in equation (50), MCM. Therefore, every point of MCC is strictly to the left of 
MCM. If γΦ > , then  the slope of 1Mk γ −  in left-hand side of equation (50), MRM is flatter 
than that of 1Ck
γ −  in left-hand side of equation (48), MRC, which implies that 1 1M Ck k
γ γ− −> . 
Note that as 1γ < , so M Ck k< .  
      If γ >> Φ , then the slope of 1Mk γ −  in left-hand side (MRM) is much steeper than that 
of 1Ck
γ −  in left-hand side (MRC), which might lead to the conclusion of 1 1M Ck k
γ γ− −< . This 
implies M Ck k>  as 1γ < . The competitive banking system has a better performance 
because the allocative advantage of monopoly bank will disappear. This can be 
interpreted in a different way. If the proportion of high quality firms is high and 
screening activities do not give any economic benefit, then no banks have incentive to 
screen. But if the proportion of high quality firm is much lower, as seen in developing 
countries, screening activities may make the value added although screening costs very 
large. In the case of low proportion of high quality firms, a monopoly banking system 
may have a better performance. This result is consistent with Cetorelli’s (1997): he 
suggests that for the developing countries, a monopolistic bank may have a better 
performance.  
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Case 1: γΦ >   
 
                        
                                                 1 1M Ck k
γ γ− −>   ↔  M Ck k<  since 1γ <   
 
Case 2: γ >> Φ   
                         
                                                 1 1M Ck k
γ γ− −<  ↔  C Mk k<  since  1γ <  
 
FIGURE 4.-Equilibrium Level of Capital – Monopoly and Competitive Banking 
System with High Screening Cost 
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MCC 
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APPENDIX C 
PROOFS 
 
Proposition 1: Aggregate Credit and Capital 
 
      First, I will show N R St t tX X X> > . 
If no banks screen, the total saving from old agents becomes loans supplied to firms, 
i.e. Nt tX S= . However, if all banks screen, because of the screening cost, the total credit 
available credit will be ( )j j St t t tN s b Ns S Xµ µ− = = = . Therefore N St t t tX S S Xµ= > = as 
0 1µ< < . When the probability of screening is considered, the total available credit is 
(C.1)           (1 ) (1 ) [1 (1 )]R S N Nt t t t t t t t t t t t tX q X q X q S q S q S S Xµ µ= + − = + − = − − < =  
since the fraction of firms that are screened, [0,1]tq ∈ . To compare the size of ,R St tX X , 
we obtain the difference of both coefficients.  
(C.2)        [(1 ) ] (1 )(1 ) 0R St t t t t t tX X q q S q Sµ µ µ− = − + − = − − >  since 0<µ<1 & 0<qt<1. 
Hence, N R St t tX X X> >  
      Next, I will show N R St t tx x x< <  or N S Rt t tx x x< < . 
To compare the size of credit for an individual firm, we need the number of firms that 
receive credit. If there is no screening, all the firms are credit recipients. With mass unit 
of entrepreneurs, N Nt t tx X S= = . If all banks screen, only high quality firms ( )Φ  have 
access to credit. Hence, 
S
S Nt
t t t t
Xx S S xµ= = > =Φ Φ since µ > Φ by definition. When 
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randomizing with probability tq , the number of firms that have access to credit is 
(1 ) 1 (1 )t t tq q q− + Φ = − − Φ . Therefore, the expected credit for an individual firm, Rtx is  
(C.3)                      (1 (1 )
1 (1 )
R Nt
t t t t
t
qx S S x
q
µ − −= > = − − Φ   
since µ > Φ  by assumption.  
      To compare the size of Stx  and 
R
tx , we obtain the difference of both coefficients,. 
(C.4)                   1 (1 ) ( )(1 ) 0
1 (1 ) [1 (1 )]
S R t t
t t t t
t t
q qx x S S
q q
µ µµ   − − − Φ −− = − = >   Φ − − Φ Φ − − Φ     
since µ > Φ  by assumption. Hence, N R St t tx x x< < . 
 
Proposition 2: Critical Degree of Information Externality 
 
      The proof is straightforward. By comparing the screening cost (if banks screen) and 
the opportunity cost (if banks do not screen), we can derive the critical level of 
information externality.  
      The screening cost is  
(C.5)                                                (1 ) jtsµ− . 
 The opportunity cost of not screening firms is  
(C.6)                       
{Pr ( ) * Pr ( / ) Pr ( ) * Pr ( / )}
1- 1-
{ ( ) (1- )( )}
2 2
j
t
j
t
ob H ob L H ob L ob H L s
s
η η
ξ ξ
= + =
= Φ + Φ
% %% %
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Let *ξ be the critical level of information externality which equates the screening cost 
and opportunity cost. Equate above opportunity cost to (1 ) jtsµ−  and solve for *ξ ,  
(C.7)                                                       * 2 1ξ µ= −  
      The above relationship implies that if we have highly efficient screening technology, 
i.e. µÆ1, we should have perfect information externality to be equated the payoffs of 
screening equilibrium and no-screening equilibrium. In other words, if we have higher 
screening technology, banks are more likely to have higher payoffs when they are 
engaged in screening activities. In addition, as 0 1ξ≤ ≤ , 1 2 1µ≤ ≤ . It means that the 
aggregate amount of screening cost should not exceed a half of total lending amount. 
      If * 2 1ξ ξ µ> = − , then the opportunity cost of no screening is less than screening 
cost. Therefore, banks will decide not to screen. Similarly, if * 2 1ξ ξ µ< = − , banks will 
decide to screen since screening gives more payoffs. 
 
Proposition 3: No Screening Equilibrium 
 
      First, I will show that *jz NS=  for every j=1,2,…,N  is an equilibrium.  
If all banks choose {No Screening}, the total revenue will be 1
L
t tR S+Φ  as discussed. 
Given the zero-profit condition, we can derive deposit interest rate 1tr + , which is 1
L
tR +Φ . 
Suppose that a bank j deviates and decides to screen. Since the information about 
screened high quality firms becomes public immediately, all “outside” banks make a 
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better offer to the entrepreneurs. Therefore, a screening bank j suffers a loss, i.e. 0jπ < . 
There, thus, is no incentive for any banks to deviate from the optimal strategy, i.e. 
jz NS=  for every j=1,2,…,N.  Therefore, *jz NS=  is an equilibrium. 
      Next, I will show *jz NS=  is unique equilibrium. Suppose jz NS′ ≠  is an 
equilibrium. Then, a bank j j′∈  will be subject to free riding and will suffer a net loss 
as shown above. If this bank decides to deviate and choose NS, it will benefit from free 
riding and will make at least zero profits. Therefore, jz NS′ ≠  is not an equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 4: Screening Equilibrium 
 
      First, I will show that *jz S=  is an equilibrium.  
If all banks choose to screen, the total revenue will be 1
L
t tR Sµ + , which is greater than the 
payoffs of no screening, 1
L
t tR S+Φ . Given the zero-profit condition, the deposit interest 
rate 1tr +  is 1
L
tRµ +  if screened, and 1LtR +Φ  if not. Suppose that a bank j deviates and decides 
not to screen. Then the bank j’s deposit interest rate will be lower than other banks’. As 
depositors seek for higher deposit rates, a bank j will exit in the market. There, thus, is 
no incentive to deviate from the optimal strategy jz S= . Therefore, *jz S=  is an 
equilibrium for every j=1,2,…,N.   
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      Next, I show *jz S=  is a unique equilibrium. Suppose that jz S′ ≠  is an equilibrium. 
Then, a bank j j′∈  will exit from this market. If this bank decides to deviate and choose 
S, it will make at least zero profits. Therefore, iz S′ ≠  is not an equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 5: Payoffs Comparison 
 
      First, I will show 2 1Π > Π . In the case of 2Π  (No Screening, Screening), bank i does 
not screen, but he can recognize high quality firms because another bank screens the 
firms and the information about the quality of firms are publicized immediately. Hence, 
bank i can use his all available fund to lend to only screened high quality firms. In the 
case of 1Π  (Screening, Screening), bank i can recognize high quality firms with cost of 
screening. Therefore, the amount of loan is less than that in case 2Π . Therefore, 
2 1Π > Π . 
      Next, I will show 4 3Π > Π . In the case of 4Π  (No Screening, No Screening), bank i 
lends to all firms indiscriminately. Hence, he can recover itsΦ . However, in the case of 
3Π  (Screening, No Screening), bank i does screen and distinguish high quality firms but 
bank j lends to screened high quality firm. Instead, bank i lends to both high and low 
quality firms indiscriminately. Hence he can recover itsµΦ . Hence, 4 3Π > Π . By 
assumption, we know that 1 4Π > Π . Therefore 2 1 4 3Π > Π > Π > Π holds. 
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Proposition 6: No Screening Equilibrium 
  
      It is straightforward. From Table XI, we can easily find the best response for bank i 
is {No screening} regardless of bank j’s strategies, and vice verse. iBR N= & 
jBR N= , Hence, Nash equilibrium is no bank screens, i.e. (NS, NS) 
      Table XI shows the payoff of bank i, j given their own stage one strategy. If both 
banks screen, the payoffs of both banks 1Π , If bank1 (bank2) screens but bank2 (bank1) 
does not screen, bank2 (bank1) benefit from information externality. Then, the payoffs 
of bank1 (bank2) and bank2 (bank1) are 3Π , 2Π  respectively. However, if both banks 
do not screen, their payoffs are same to 4Π .  
 
Table XI 
Payoffs of Banks 
Bank 2 
 
Screen (S) No Screen (N) 
Screen (S) 1 1,Π Π  3 2,Π Π  
Bank 1 
No Screen (N) 2 3,Π Π  4 4,Π Π  
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Proposition 7: Screening Equilibrium 
  
      It is straightforward. From Table XII, we can easily find the best response for bank i 
is {Screening} regardless of bank j’s strategies, and vice verse. iBR S= & jBR S= , 
Hence, Nash equilibrium is no bank screens, i.e. (S, S) 
      Table XII shows the payoff of bank i, j given their own stage one strategy. If a bank  
screens, the payoffs of the bank is  1Π , while a bank does not screen, the payoffs is 4Π .  
As 1Π  is greater than 4Π . a bank’s best strategy is screening.  
 
Table XII 
Payoffs of Banks 
Bank 2 
 
Screen (S) No Screen (N) 
Screen (S) 1 1,Π Π  1 4,Π Π  
Bank 1 
No Screen (N) 4 1,Π Π  4 4,Π Π  
    
 
 
 115 
FOC of profit maximization problem for monopoly 
 
(C.8)                 Objective function: 1 1
L M
t t t tR s r sµ + +−     
                          Subject to:              11 1
L
t tR k
γγ −+ +=  
                                                          
1 1
1
1( ) [ ]M t tt
t
sr
s
α−
α α+
ω −= β  
                                                          1 1(1 )t tw k
γγ+ += −  
                                                           1t tk sµ+ = Φ   
Plugging constraints into objective function,      
(C.9)                
t+1
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
{k }
1( ) [ 1] ( )Max t t t tk k k kγ µ µ
α−
γ−1 − −α α+ + +  Φ γ − Φ (1− γ) − Φβ                              
Differentiating with respect to 1tk + ,  
(C.10)           
1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
1 1
1 1 1 2
1 1 1
π 1( ) [ (1 ) 1]
1 1( ) ( )[ (1 ) 1] [ (1 ) ] 0
t t t
t
t t t t t
k k k
k
k k k k k
α
γ γα α
γ γα α
γ µ µ γβ
αµ µ γ µ γβ α
−
− − − − −
+ +
+
−
− − − −
+ + +
∂ = Φ − Φ Φ − −∂
−− Φ Φ − − −Φ − =
 
By rearranging terms,   
(C.11)               
1 1
2 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 (1 )( ) [ ][ (1 ) 1] 0t t t t tk k k k k
γ γ γα αγγ µ µ γβ α
−
− − − −
+ + +
Φ −− − Φ − − =  
Hence, 
(C.12)                       
1 1
1 1
2 1
1 1
1
1
[ ]1( ) { } 0
1]
t t
t
t t
k k
k
k k
γ
γ
γ
µ
γ
µ
− −
+− α+
− α+
Φ(1− γ) −α− =β [Φ (1− γ) −
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Proposition 8: Unique Steady State Level of Capital 
 
      The left-hand side of equation (48), (49) and (50) are linearly increasing in 1Ck
γ − , 1MCk
γ −  
and 1Mk
γ − , respectively. The right-hand side of (48), (49) and (50) have a vertical 
asymptote for 1 2
1
(1 )C
k γ γ
− = Φ − , 
1 1
(1 )MC
k γ µ γ
− = Φ −  and 
1 1
(1 )M
k γ µ γ
− = Φ − , respectively. 
And those are converging to zero as 1Ck
γ − → ∞ , 1MCk γ − → ∞ , 1Mk γ − → ∞ , respectively. 
Thus, in all cases, there is unique long run equilibrium, Ck , MCk  and Mk . 
 
Proposition 9: Ck < MCk  As ξ  Increases 
 
      Figure 5 depicts the steady state level of capital in competitive market with high 
information externality ( *ξ ξ> ) and with low information externality ( *ξ ξ< ). Note that 
screening cost is assumed to be less than investment loss from lending to lower quality 
firms, i.e. µ > Φ . Therefore, the vertical asymptote for the marginal cost in the 
competitive bank with low information externality (MCMC) is strictly lower than that 
with high information externality (MCC). Hence, every point of MCC is strictly to the 
right of MCMC. Note that µ > Φ  by assumption. Therefore, the slope of 1MCk γ −  in left-hand 
side (MRMC) is steeper than that of 1Ck
γ − in left-hand side (MRC), which implies 
1 1
MC Ck k
γ γ− −< . Note that as 1γ < , C MCk k< .  
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                                                  1 1MC Ck k
γ γ− −<   ↔  C MCk k<  as 1γ <   
 
 
FIGURE 5.-Equilibrium Level of Capital - Competitive Banking System with 
Information Externality 
MCMC 
MCC 
MCMC 
MCC
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γ −
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Proposition 10 and Corollary 1: C MCk k<  if µ γ>   
 
      Figure 6 depicts the relationship between the steady state level of capital in 
competitive market and that in monopoly market if there is no information externality. 
From equation (49) and (50), we know that the vertical asymptote for the right hand side 
are same in both cases, say 1
(1 )µ γΦ − . But coefficient of 
1k γ −  in numerator of monopoly 
bank, (1 )γα
Φ − is greater than that of monopolistically competitive bank, (1 )µ γΦ − as 
1 µα > . Therefore, MCMC is strictly lower than MCM. Hence, every point of MCM is 
strictly to the right of MCMC. If µ γ> , the slope of 1MCk γ −  in left-hand side (MRMC) is 
steeper than that of 1Mk
γ −  in left-hand side (MRM), which implies that 1 1MC Mk k
γ γ− −< . Note 
that since 1γ < , M MCk k< . However, if  γ µ>> , then the slope of 1Mk γ −  in left-hand side, 
MRM, is much steeper than that of 1MCk
γ −  in MRMC, which may obtain the result that 
1 1
M MCk k
γ γ− −< . Note that since 1γ < ,  M MCk k> .  
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Case 1: µ γ>  
                              
                                                     1 1MC Mk k
γ γ− −<   ↔  M MCk k<  since 1γ <   
 
Case 2: γ µ>>  
                              
                                                 1 1M MCk k
γ γ− −<   ↔  MC Mk k<  since 1γ <   
 
 
FIGURE 6.-Equilibrium Level of Capital – Monopoly and Competitive Banking 
System with Low Information Externality 
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Proposition 11 and Corollary 2: M Ck k>  if γ > Φ  
 
      It is straightforward. Figure 7 shows self evident for Proposition 11 and Corollary 2. 
From (48) and (50) we know that the vertical asymptote for the right hand side in the 
competitive bank (MCC) is strictly higher than that in the monopoly bank (MCM). 
Therefore, every point of MCC is strictly to the right of MCM. If γ > Φ , then  the slope 
of 1Mk
γ −  in left-hand side (MRM) is steeper than that of 1Ck
γ −  in left-hand side (MRC), 
which implies that 1 1M Ck k
γ γ− −< . Note that as 1γ < , so M Ck k> . However, if γΦ >> , then 
the slope of 1Ck
γ −  in left-hand side, MRC, is much steeper than that of 1Mk
γ −  in MRM, 
which may obtain the result that 1 1C Mk k
γ γ− −< . Note that as 1γ < , so M Ck k< .  
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Case 1: γ > Φ  
                         
                                                 1 1M Ck k
γ γ− −<   ↔ C Mk k<  since γ <1  
 
Case 2: γ << Φ    
                         
                                                 1 1M Ck k
γ γ− −>   ↔  C Mk k>  since 1γ <   
 
 
FIGURE 7.-Equilibrium Level of Capital – Monopoly and Competitive Banking 
System with High Information Externality 
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Proposition 12 
 
      From Proposition 10, we know that under low information externality, M Ck k<  if 
µ γ> , for any value of the remaining parameters. However, from Proposition 11, we 
know that under high information externality, M Ck k>  if γ > Φ  for any value of the 
remaining parameters. Therefore, in order for M Ck k=  to hold, it must be that * (0,1)ξ ∈ . 
And if *ξ ξ> , M Ck k>  and vice verse. 
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